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Originality Proxies 
TOWARD A THEORY OF COPYRIGHT AND 
CREATIVITY 
Eva E. Subotnik† 
INTRODUCTION 
Theoretically, a perfect photograph is absolutely inexhaustible. In a 
picture you can find nothing which the artist has not seen before 
you; but in a perfect photograph there will be as many beauties 
lurking, unobserved, as there are flowers that blush unseen in 
forests and meadows.1 
The recent copyright “case” célèbre Shepard Fairey v. 
Associated Press,2 a dispute over images at the heart of a 
successful presidential campaign, involved a photograph that 
depicted the intent face of Barack Obama framed by the soft 
backdrop of the American flag (the “Obama Photograph”). 
 
  
 † Assistant Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law. The funding 
for this article was generously provided by the Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the 
Arts at Columbia Law School during my tenure as an Intellectual Property Fellow. Many 
thanks to Johan Axhamn, June Besek, Vincent Blasi, Robert Clarida, Jessica Clarke, 
Mathilde Cohen, Brett Dakin, Erin Delaney, Harold Edgar, Christine Haight Farley, 
Robert Ferguson, Jane Ginsburg, Lital Helman, Scott Hemphill, Bert Huang, Dan 
Hunter, Kathryn Judge, Michael Kavey, Joseph Landau, Greg Lastowka, Dina Leytes, 
Phillipa Loengard, Clarisa Long, Jeffrey Malkan, Saira Mohamed, Anthony O’Rourke, 
Burak Ozgen, Jessica Roberts, Bertrall Ross, Tali Schaefer, David Simon, Irene Ten Cate, 
Rebecca Tushnet, Carissa Vogel, Martha Woodmansee, Tim Wu, Diane Leenheer 
Zimmerman, the participants of the 2010 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, and 
the participants of the Columbia Law School Associates and Fellows Workshop. This 
article is dedicated to the memory of Professor Mayer Freed, greatly missed, who was 
similarly drawn to law and photography. 
 1 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., The Stereoscope and the Stereograph, in 
CLASSIC ESSAYS ON PHOTOGRAPHY 71, 77-78 (Alan Trachtenberg ed., 1980). 
 2 No. 09 Civ. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2009).  
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AP Images/Mannie Garcia 
The case proceeded under competing theories of infringement 
and fair use, inquiring into the nature of the relationship 
between the photograph, taken by AP photographer Mannie 
Garcia,3 and the campaign posters that graphic artist Shepard 
Fairey created based on it. Thus, the court filings probed 
whether the posters were sufficiently “transformative,” in the 
parlance of fair use, and whether they usurped the photograph’s 
rightful market.4 Also swirling around the Obama Photograph 
were important and recurring questions about the level of 
originality and authorship reflected in the photograph itself. 
Cultural critic Luc Sante, for example, suggested that such a 
photograph “might have been taken by a child or a robot or a 
chimpanzee—it’s nowhere near as hard as randomly typing 
Shakespeare, and for that matter, it’s a lot more a matter of luck 
than are most of the great pieces of photojournalism.”5  
  
 3 At one point in the litigation, the nature of Garcia’s relationship with the 
AP during the relevant period, that of independent contractor or employee status, was 
contested; Garcia, who claimed the former status, ultimately withdrew from the 
litigation. See Stipulation of Discontinuance With Prejudice, Fairey v. Associated 
Press, No. 09 Civ. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2010). 
 4 See, e.g., Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive 
Relief, at 4, 11, Fairey v. Associated Press, No. 09 Civ. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009); 
Associated Press’s First Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims, at 
14-15, Fairey v. Associated Press, No. 09 Civ. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2009) 
[hereinafter AP Amended Answer]. 
 5 Noam Cohen, Viewing Journalism as a Work of Art, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 
2009, at C2 (quoting Sante). 
2011] ORIGINALITY PROXIES 1489 
Provocative as Sante’s comments are, they do not 
purport to address—and yet succeed in raising—the legal 
question of whether the Obama Photograph is an original work 
of authorship entitling it to copyright protection.6 One might 
suppose that the answer to this question was a foregone 
conclusion; photographs—especially those of human subjects—
have long been deemed, on the highest authority, a worthy 
subject for copyright protection.7 Further, the instances in 
which courts have denied them protection on originality 
grounds are very rare and, so far, untested by appellate 
review.8 Nevertheless, court dockets bustle with copyright 
litigation in which the defendant argues that the plaintiff’s 
photograph lacks originality. Courts continue to feel it 
necessary (and perhaps enjoy the opportunity) to engage at 
length with this argument.9 Copyright scholars, too, have 
continued to question the originality of photographs taken in 
varying contexts and for varying purposes.10 Some scholarship 
has taken explicit issue with the protection available for the 
likes of the Obama Photograph. Accepting the photograph’s 
likely protectability under the current copyright regime, 
Professor Joseph Miller has maintained that, to the extent 
such an “accurate, anodyne, [and] conventional” photograph is 
  
 6 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (providing for copyright protection for 
“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression”); Feist 
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (determining that 
originality is a constitutional requirement for copyright protection). 
 7 See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884); see 
also Thornton v. Schreiber, 124 U.S. 612 (1888); infra Part I.A. 
 8 In Oriental Art Printing Inc. v. GS Printing Corp., 34 Fed. App’x 401 (2d 
Cir. 2002), the Second Circuit did not reach the district court’s conclusion on this 
question. Id. at 402. 
 9 Almost fifty years ago, Professor Robert Gorman noted how much time courts 
spent on the question of originality in photography; the issue remains lively today. See 
Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 
HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1596 (1963). 
 10 See, e.g., JUSTIN HUGHES, The Photographer’s Copyright, in AUTHOR IN THE 
MACHINE: CREATIVITY, COPYRIGHT, AND THE COMPUTER (October 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the author); Kathleen Connolly Butler, Keeping the World 
Safe from Naked-Chicks-in-Art Refrigerator Magnets: The Plot to Control Art Images in 
the Public Domain Through Copyrights in Photographic and Digital Reproductions, 21 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 55, 103-14 (1998); Gorman, supra note 9, at 1594-1600; 
Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rationalizing the Allocative/Distributive Relationship in Copyright, 
32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 853, 898-904 (2004); Michael J. Madison, Beyond Creativity: 
Copyright as Knowledge Law, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 817, 818-19 (2010); Joseph 
Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 456-57 (2009).  
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sufficiently original so as to be protected by copyright, “so much 
the worse . . . for copyright law.”11 
So, should this photograph be considered original for the 
purpose of copyright? Should all photographs? This article 
contends that a definitive account of originality as a legal 
construct is not possible and that, as a result, the current low 
threshold for originality should be maintained. Under this 
analysis, most photographs, so long as they comply with 
certain requirements, should be granted protection, at the very 
least, against exact copying (for example, through digital 
copying and pasting). Arriving at this conclusion, however, 
requires a return to first principles, that is, to the copyright 
concepts of authorship and originality. These concepts saw 
their most recent articulation by the Supreme Court in the 
1991 landmark decision of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Telephone Service Co., which held that the white page phone 
listings before it did not merit copyright protection.12 The Court 
determined that originality is a constitutional prerequisite for 
copyright protection and that it entails a two-pronged showing: 
(1) “that the work was independently created” (that is, that it 
was not copied), and (2) that the work manifests “some 
minimal degree of creativity.”13 The white page listings failed 
on the second count; they comprised a factual compilation 
reflecting insufficient “creative spark.”14 
Since Feist was handed down, a vast body of academic 
work has focused on how the decision should apply outside its 
immediate factual predicate to other sorts of works. One group 
of scholars has focused on the degree to which fact-driven 
works, such as maps, site plans, and many compilations, 
should be afforded—post-Feist—the protections of copyright 
law.15 For some, there was concern that socially useful works 
  
 11 Miller, supra note 10, at 456; see also Madison, supra note 10, at 818-19 
(questioning the creative merits of the Obama Photograph). For additional discussion 
of various aspects of the Obama Photograph, including protectability, scope of 
protection, and fair use, see HUGHES, supra note 10, at 28-32 and H. Brian Holland, 
Social Semiotics in the Fair Use Analysis, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2011). 
 12 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 13 Id. at 345.  
 14 Id. at 345, 362-64.  
 15 See, e.g., Howard B. Abrams, Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at 3; Alan L. Durham, Speaking of the World: 
Fact, Opinion and the Originality Standard of Copyright, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 791 (2001); 
Jane C. Ginsburg, No “Sweat”? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information 
After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1992); Justin Hughes, Created 
Facts and the Flawed Ontology of Copyright Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 43 (2007); 
Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright and Creativity, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 169 (2008) 
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that could be characterized as “too factual” would be produced 
at suboptimal levels in the face of uncertain protection.16 A 
second group of scholars has addressed the ways in which Feist 
should be applied to works closer to what we might loosely 
deem “the arts.”17 As Professor Robert Gorman noted, Feist 
“does not address—obviously, the Court had no cause to—the 
question of how the ‘creative spark’ standard is to be applied to 
works of art, music and literature.”18 A number of the scholars 
taking up this latter question have expressed the opposite 
concern from the first group. They have cautioned that too many 
nominally creative works are granted the exclusivity rights of 
copyright and that these sorts of works ought to undergo more 
robust scrutiny on originality grounds.19 
Situating photography on the fact-art continuum 
suggested by Feist, and theorizing whether the opinion might 
  
[hereinafter Karjala, Copyright and Creativity]; Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright in 
Electronic Maps, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 395 (1995); Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of 
Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683 (2003); Jessica Litman, After Feist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 607 
(1992); Leo J. Raskind, Assessing the Impact of Feist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 331 (1992); 
Pamela Samuelson, The Originality Standard for Literary Works Under U.S. Copyright 
Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 393 (1994); David E. Shipley, Thin But Not Anorexic: 
Copyright Protection for Compilations and Other Fact Works, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. 91 
(2007); Marc K. Temin, The Irrelevance of Creativity: Feist’s Wrong Turn and the Scope of 
Copyright Protection for Factual Works, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 263 (2006); Alfred C. Yen, 
The Legacy of Feist: Consequences of the Weak Connection Between Copyright and the 
Economics of Public Goods, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1343 (1991). 
 16 See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 353; Hughes, supra note 15, at 92; 
Karjala, Copyright and Creativity, supra note 15, at 182. 
 17 See, e.g., Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: Copyright, 
Creation, and Context, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 477 (2007); Ralph D. Clifford, Random 
Numbers, Chaos Theory, and Cogitation: A Search for the Minimal Creativity Standard 
in Copyright Law, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 259 (2004); Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Courts 
and Aesthetic Judgments: Abuse or Necessity?, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (2001); 
Harrison, supra note 10; Madison, supra note 10; Miller, supra note 10; Gideon 
Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV. 1505 (2009); Russ VerSteeg, 
Rethinking Originality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801 (1993); Diane Leenheer 
Zimmerman, It’s an Original!(?): In Pursuit of Copyright’s Elusive Essence, 28 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 187 (2005). 
 18 Gorman, supra note 17, at 3; see also Mitch Tuchman, Inauthentic Works of 
Art: Why Bridgeman May Ultimately Be Irrelevant to Art Museums, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. 
& ARTS 287, 304 (2001). For a lyrical approach to the white pages qua book, see Lizzie 
Widdicombe, Endangered Species In The Book, NEW YORKER, Sept. 13, 2010, at 22-23. 
 19 See Harrison, supra note 10, at 859; Miller, supra note 10, at 463-64; 
Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 17, at 1506; Zimmerman, supra note 17, at 205-06; 
cf. Madison, supra note 10, at 830 (noting creativity’s weak role at policing entry to 
copyright protection and favoring a reformulated copyright policy aimed at enhancing 
knowledge). To be sure, there is overlap between the concerns of the two groups of 
scholars mentioned. Professor Dennis Karjala, for example, also has expressed concern 
that too many fact-driven works may be granted copyright protection even though they 
are more appropriate candidates either for patent protection or for no protection at all. 
See Karjala, Copyright and Creativity, supra note 15, at 185-87. 
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lead to an under- or oversupply of works in this medium, is not 
readily accomplished. Photography has always walked a fine 
line between “merely” reflecting reality and reflecting artistic 
imprint.20 “Daguerreotypemania,” for example, captured public 
attention through its ability to provide portraiture at a level of 
exacting detail beyond anything previously imaginable.21 At the 
same time, many of the first photographers were former 
painters whose richly stylized work was seen as reflecting 
artistic sensibilities.22 Even the Supreme Court’s seminal 
photography decision of 1884, Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. 
Sarony, potentially set up a dichotomy between “graceful” 
photographs, which would be protected under copyright, and 
those in which “accuracy” was the “highest merit,” which might 
not be.23 A tension is also apparent in today’s world, where 
precise digital imaging is relied upon to perform surgery 
safely.24 At the same time, modern digital photography clearly 
has opened up many new avenues for creativity. Indeed, some 
commentators argue that it is digital photography’s extreme 
susceptibility to creative manipulation, rather than its 
reflection of reality, that will come to be its hallmark.25 
  
 20 This vast topic, including the dual development of photography as an art 
form and as evidence in court proceedings, has been addressed comprehensively by 
others. See, e.g., Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright’s Response 
to the Invention of Photography, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385, 389 (2004); Jennifer L. 
Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 10 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 14 (1998); Jessica M. Silbey, Filmmaking in the Precinct House 
and the Genre of Documentary Film, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 107, 110-11 (2005). In his 
treatment of issues relating to fact-driven works, Professor Gorman evidently saw fit to 
categorize photographs in that group. Gorman, supra note 9, at 1594-1600. 
 21 JOHN TAGG, THE BURDEN OF REPRESENTATION: ESSAYS ON PHOTOGRAPHIES 
AND HISTORIES 42-43 (1993). 
 22 Walter Benjamin, Little History of Photography, in THE WORK OF ART IN 
THE AGE OF ITS TECHNOLOGICAL REPRODUCIBILITY AND OTHER WRITINGS ON MEDIA 
274, 281 (Michael W. Jennings et al. eds., Edmund Jephcott et al. trans., Belknap 
Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2008); MARIA MORRIS HAMBOURG ET AL., THE WAKING 
DREAM: PHOTOGRAPHY’S FIRST CENTURY 44-45 (1993); TAGG, supra note 21, at 45. 
Somewhat contradictorily, Benjamin says of the miniaturists-turned-photographers both 
that “the experience of their original livelihood stood them in good stead” and that “it is 
not their artistic background so much as their training as craftsman that we have to 
thank for the high level of their photographic achievement.” Benjamin, supra, at 281.  
 23 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884). 
 24 The charge-coupled device, whose inventors were awarded the Nobel Prize in 
Physics in 2009, advanced immeasurably the fields of astronomy and medicine by 
enabling the digital imaging of both outer space and the human body. ROYAL SWEDISH 
ACAD. OF SCI., SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND ON THE NOBEL PRIZE IN PHYSICS 2009: TWO 
REVOLUTIONARY OPTICAL TECHNOLOGIES 12-14 (2009), available at http://nobelprize. 
org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/2009/sci.html. 
 25 See, e.g., FRED RITCHIN, AFTER PHOTOGRAPHY 58 (2009) (“In the digital 
arena one cannot with any certainty look at a photograph and say, ‘So that is how it 
was.’”); Raphael Winick, Intellectual Property, Defamation and the Digital Alteration of 
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On a practical level, however, photographs have been 
treated, in the vast majority of litigated copyright cases, as 
works of authorship that easily clear the originality threshold 
outlined by Feist. This tradition of near-presumptive copyright 
protection exists despite the fact that it is difficult in today’s 
environment to envision a market failure—a condition 
justifying copyright for some commentators—with respect to 
the creation of photographs; they are being produced in 
droves.26 It also exists despite the fact that, as a doctrinal matter, 
Feist seems to rule out assertions of creativity that are couched 
in “practically inevitable” decision making, such as the 
alphabetical arrangement of white page listings.27 Theoretically, 
then, a snapshot reflecting the sole authorial input of instructing 
a group of subjects to gather closely and say “cheese” might fail 
Feist’s creativity requirement. Not surprisingly, however, the 
disputes that have fleshed out the requirements for 
photographic copyright have arisen over professional images,28 
which traditionally have involved a more sophisticated web of 
economic stimuli and authorial decision making than the 
average snapshot. The courts adjudicating these cases often 
seem driven by the desire to protect copyright plaintiffs from 
outright copying by competitors or former clients and frequently 
do not provide a persuasive explanation of what makes a 
  
Visual Images, 21 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 143, 150 (1997) (remarking that “never 
before has a palette of techniques existed with the variety and power now provided by 
the computer” by which to modify visual images); Zachariah B. Parry, Note, Digital 
Manipulation and Photographic Evidence: Defrauding the Courts One Thousand Words 
at a Time, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 175, 176; Karen D. Williams, Comment, 
Disparity in Copyright Protection: Focus on the Finished Image Ignores the Art in the 
Details, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 169, 172 (2008) (“With advances in design and photography 
software, the lines between photography and graphic design are blurring.”). 
 26 Indeed, it is difficult to overstate the ubiquity of photographic equipment and 
images. In 2007, some 250 billion digital photographs were said to have been taken and 
nearly one billion camera phones used. RITCHIN, supra note 25, at 11. In fact, despite the 
vast differences separating the oldest and the most cutting-edge forms of photography, 
both rapidly became available to the masses. See, e.g., RICHARD CHALFEN, SNAPSHOT 
VERSIONS OF LIFE 71 (1987) (discussing nineteenth century expansion); Farley, supra 
note 20, at 427 (same); Mnookin, supra note 20, at 12 (same). 
 27 Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991). 
 28 It is true that the case adjudicating the copyright dispute arising out of the 
amateur filming of the J.F.K. assassination, Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis, 293 F. Supp. 
130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), has been influential in the development of photography copyright 
doctrine, but it is a highly unusual case. So far, the typical swapping of images among 
friends has not resulted in a discrete body of copyright jurisprudence. See John 
Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and The Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH 
L. REV. 537, 545 (describing typical unthinking, unlitigated sharing of amateur 
photographs); cf. Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617, 619-20 (2008) 
(discussing prevalence of tolerated use and implicitly licensed use of copyrighted works). 
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litigated photograph original and hence protectable (an omission 
that is not unique to photography decisions). 
Drawing upon the abundant stock of originality 
jurisprudence in the area of photography, this article argues 
that courts are ultimately doomed to fail in the quest to 
explain, in a satisfying way, how a work of authorship is 
original in and of itself. Caught between the impermissibility of 
relying upon aesthetic virtues, on the one hand, and the degree 
of effort expended by an author, on the other,29 the closest 
courts can come to identifying originality, at least under the 
current copyright framework, is through proxies for the legal 
concept. Building upon the use of the proxy device by others in 
intellectual property scholarship,30 this article identifies three 
that serve this function: the proxy of ontology, the proxy of 
narrative, and the proxy of comparison.  
The proxy of ontology reflects the reliance by courts on a 
work’s existence as a photograph as the basis for their 
originality determinations. This proxy is the most suspect 
under Feist because it implies that an image is original merely 
if it is not a copy31 and sidesteps the creativity requirement. 
The proxy of narrative refers to the courts’ use of authorial 
  
 29 See infra Part I. 
 30 Several scholars have invoked the proxy device as a means of describing 
various aspects of the workings of intellectual property law, even if they have not all 
employed the particular term. See, e.g., Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of 
Objectivity: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value 
Judgments, 66 IND. L.J. 175, 216, 219-20 (1990) (identifying the judge’s “personal 
reaction” to the works, their relative commercial success, and the reputation of the 
creators as proxies for judicial idea/expression determinations); Christine Haight 
Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 845-49 (2005) (arguing that judicial 
intuitions have guided judges’ analysis on aesthetic issues); Jessica Litman, The Public 
Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1001-02, 1004 (1990) (discussing reliance by courts on 
burden allocation to avoid thorny originality determinations); Clarisa Long, 
Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 482-95 (2004) 
(discussing proxies for identifying the protected features of an intellectual good); 
Madison, supra note 10, at 822 (arguing that, in light of the low creativity threshold, 
the “who?” of copyright is asked rather than the “what?”—that is, the content); Alfred 
C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 268, 273-74 
(1998) (showing how courts’ reasoning in ways that parallel aesthetic theory has served 
as proxy for originality determinations); see also Raymond Shih Ray Ku et al., Does 
Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An Empirical Analysis of Copyright’s Bounty, 62 
VAND. L. REV. 1669 (2009). Using copyright registration as a proxy for the creation of 
works, the authors of the latter study conclude that a rise in population, rather than 
the incentives afforded by the expansion of copyright protection, best accounts for the 
increase in the number of works documented. Id. at 1673-74. 
 31 See, e.g., Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 519 (7th Cir. 
2009); Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(subsequent history omitted); Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1083 n.2 (Nelson, J., dissenting); 
see also 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[E][2].  
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narrative submitted by copyright plaintiffs to identify 
originality. Through this method, a court translates a visual 
work into text, a medium in which it more comfortably 
operates.32 The proxy of comparison reflects the way in which 
courts attempt to identify originality by comparing a litigated 
image to others, which have often been submitted by the 
parties. This method of relying on a visual comparison to 
assess a visual work arguably comes closest to grounding an 
originality determination in the image itself.33  
Given the courts’ inability to reach originality in an 
unmediated fashion, the current originality threshold, which is 
low, should be left intact and the problematic aspects of 
copyright’s expansiveness should be checked at other points. In 
contrast to scholars who argue that raising the threshold would 
lead to the production of more highly creative works, this 
article submits that such a modification would likely result in 
greater manipulation of the proxies, determinations based on 
judicial subjectivity, and/or undesirable distortions of behavior 
to comply with a legal rule. Finally, the article leaves off with 
the question of whether, to the extent raising the originality 
threshold would rule out copyright protection for images such 
as the Obama Photograph, such a move should be considered in 
light of the structure of American copyright and the ways in 
which industries may have organized themselves around that 
structure. Specifically, a move to withdraw protection from 
“low originality” works might actually impair “high creative” 
output where the low originality works serve as a kind of cross-
subsidy for the creative endeavors, it is hoped, authors will 
undertake over the course of their careers. 
This article proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, it 
discusses the originality standards that furnish the basis for 
judicial assessments of originality today. This Part traces the 
origins of the proxy approach to originality. In Part II, the 
article sets forth the contemporary legal settings in which 
questions about originality in photography typically arise—
copyright infringement suits over commercial photographs. 
This Part develops the three proxies, described above, which 
function as methods for making originality determinations. 
Finally, Part III draws upon the standards and cases discussed in 
  
 32 See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of 
Copyright Law, HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2012). 
 33 As will be discussed, a variation on this proxy exists where the relevant 
comparison is between an image and its depicted subject matter. See infra Part II.D.2. 
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the foregoing Parts to draw conclusions and raise questions about 
how the originality doctrine should be applied to photography and 
other “artistic” works. Diverging from recent proposals in the 
scholarly literature, the article argues against a heightened 
burden of proof for originality in works of authorship.  
I. PRINCIPLES OF ORIGINALITY AND ORIGINS OF PROXIES 
As the latest word on originality from the Court, Feist 
stands as a prism through which its earlier jurisprudence is to 
be interpreted. But it is unclear how the originality doctrine in 
Feist—and in particular, the “minimal degree of creativity” 
component—should be applied outside the context of that case. 
Did the Court intend creativity to be descriptive with respect to 
certain works—that is, as an explanation of why, in contrast to 
some fact-driven compilations, traditional works of art are 
protected by copyright? Or was the creativity requirement 
meant to be prescriptive—that is, intended to subject all works, 
at least at the margins, to some meaningful scrutiny? If the 
latter, what might such scrutiny entail? In addressing these 
questions, it is necessary to consider how originality was 
assessed prior to, and in, the Feist opinion. 
A. Legal Roots of Originality and Proxies 
The Copyright Act of 1976, as amended, protects 
“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression” but provides no definition of the term “original.”34 
Discerning both statutory and constitutional imperatives, the 
Court in Feist held that copyright protection turns on the 
presence of originality.35 In arriving at this conclusion, the 
Court cited a few seminal precedents, the earliest of which had 
referenced originality and creativity elements. The Trade-Mark 
Cases held that liability for trademark infringement could not 
be grounded in the constitutional clause protecting copyrights 
and patents36 because protectable “[w]ritings” must be 
  
 34 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).  
 35 It has been widely noted that the Constitution does not use the term 
“original.” See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
Nevertheless, the Court explicitly determined that “[o]riginality is a constitutional 
requirement.” Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). 
 36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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“original,” “the fruits of intellectual labor,” and “founded in the 
creative powers of the mind,” and none of those criteria was 
required for a protectable trademark.37 While originality and 
creativity were thus explicitly mentioned, the concepts were 
not explored in great depth and were defined primarily in 
opposition to the supposedly mundane activity, in the Court’s 
view, of appropriating a symbol as a trademark. 
Five years later, in Burrow-Giles, the Court offered its 
first affirmative account of originality in the copyright sense 
when it assessed whether the extension of federal copyright 
protection to photographs was constitutional.38 With respect to 
general qualifications, the Court determined that authorial 
status could be bestowed upon one “to whom anything owes its 
origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of science 
or literature.”39 Likewise, protectable writings could “include all 
forms of writing, printing, engraving, etching, [etc.], by which 
the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible 
expression.”40 From these principles, the Court reasoned that 
the Constitution could “cover an act authorizing copyright of 
photographs, so far as they are representatives of original 
intellectual conceptions of the author.”41  
With respect to the particular photograph at issue, the 
Oscar Wilde, No. 18 photograph, the Court accepted the lower 
court’s finding that it was a 
useful, new, harmonious, characteristic, and graceful picture, and that 
plaintiff made the same . . . entirely from his own original mental 
conception, to which he gave visible form by posing the said Oscar 
Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and arranging the costume, 
draperies, and other various accessories in said photograph, arranging 
the subject so as to present graceful outlines, arranging and disposing 
the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the desired expression, 
and from such disposition, arrangement, or representation, made 
entirely by plaintiff, he produced the picture in suit.42 
Accordingly, the photograph qualified as a constitutionally 
cognizable writing and Napoleon Sarony, its prominent 
  
 37 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). 
 38 111 U.S. 53 (1884).  
 39 Id. at 57-58; see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 346. 
 40 Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58.  
 41 Id. In yet another formulation, the Court similarly stated that in seeking 
copyright protection for a “writing,” it was important to prove “those facts of 
originality, of intellectual production, of thought, and conception on the part of the 
author.” Id. at 60. 
 42 Id.  
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photographer,43 qualified as a constitutionally recognized 
author.44 The photograph merited copyright protection. 
 
 
The Oscar Wilde, No. 18 photograph,  
Copyright 1882, by N. Sarony 
Courtesy of the Library of Congress 
 
  
 43 Sarony’s prominence was such that, a few years after the Burrow-Giles 
litigation, on February 4, 1890, he photographed the Justices on the occasion of the 
100th anniversary of the Judiciary. According to available sources, Sarony was the only 
photographer to photograph that particular group of Justices, who sat together a 
relatively short period of time. E-mail from Franz Jantzen, Collections Manager, Office 
of the Curator, Supreme Court of the United States, to author (Jan. 10, 2011, 14:16 
EST) (on file with author); accord Farley, supra note 20, at 406 & n.69; Tuchman, 
supra note 18, at 299 & n.65. 
 44 Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58. Professor Christine Haight Farley notes that 
Sarony regularly worked with a cameraman, Benjamin Richardson, and that it is quite 
likely that Richardson was the person who pressed the shutter button and made other 
technical choices. Farley, supra note 20, at 434-35. 
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The Court’s unqualified adoption of this elaborate 
description appears to reflect a full engagement with the 
contents of the photograph. Indeed, the artistic choices 
delineated in the description, including those with respect to 
composition, lighting, angle, and shading, have informed 
judicial analyses of photographs ever since.45 Professor 
Christine Haight Farley has argued, however, that while 
ostensibly listing the attributes of the Oscar Wilde, No. 18 
photograph that render it an original, authored work, the 
Court in fact located authorship in the figure of the Romantic 
author—the photographer—who made “pre-shutter” decisions 
about the arrangement of the subject and scene.46 She notes that 
most of the attributes praised by the Court are not qualities of 
the photograph per se, but rather, they constitute a running 
narrative of the artistic activities undertaken by the 
photographer in setting up the photograph.47 Thus, she contends 
that the Court found authorship in photographic practice above 
photographic product, thereby supporting a view of photography 
in which a “photograph is simply a duplication of nature unless 
it is actively constructed” by the practices delineated.48  
One could argue, contrary to Farley, that by describing 
the photograph as “useful, new, harmonious, characteristic, 
and graceful,” the Court was attempting to lodge originality 
within the four corners of the image.49 Farley herself 
acknowledges the Court’s use of those descriptive words, but 
she attempts to dispel any meaningful effect they might have 
as a direct evaluation of the photograph by maintaining that 
the Court merely stated, without explaining, what made the 
  
 45 E.g., Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 519 (7th Cir. 
2009); Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(subsequent history omitted); Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450-
52 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 46 Farley, supra note 20, at 390-91, 431-32. Accord JANE M. GAINES, 
CONTESTED CULTURE: THE IMAGE, THE VOICE, AND THE LAW 69 (1991) (“Since 
personality cannot mix and mingle or flow through the machine in any way, it must 
make its mark without touching.”). 
 47 Farley, supra note 20, at 427-29. This view contrasts with Professor Joseph 
Miller’s characterization of the Court’s analysis as a “work-centered” creativity inquiry. 
Miller, supra note 10, at 475-76. 
 48 Farley, supra note 20, at 432. Accordingly, she reasons that, for the Court, 
the default position of photography was that it is authorless absent some “authorial 
intervention.” Id.; cf. GAINES, supra note 46, at 47 (quoting French scholar Bernard 
Edelman’s argument that intellectually appropriating a landscape scene requires the 
photographer to produce it rather than reproduce it).  
 49 See, e.g., Yen, supra note 31, at 247, 268, 273-74 (arguing that the Court 
invoked both formalist and intentionalist theories in assessing the Oscar Wilde, No. 18 
photograph); infra note 56 (describing these theories). 
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photograph “harmonious” or “original.”50 Farley is correct that 
the Court did not define these terms in a generally applicable—
or textual—way, but the Court arguably did provide a concrete 
definition by applying the descriptive terms to the photograph 
itself—that is, it defined them through a visual explanation.51 
However, the strength of this latter reading of the 
Court’s analysis is undercut, at least to some degree, by 
another aspect Farley identifies: that the Court’s elegant 
pronouncement (set out in the block quote above) did not draw 
upon words of its own. The very language originated not with 
the Court or the lower court but almost word for word from 
Sarony himself (or likely his counsel).52 Thus, as seemingly 
descriptive as the language of the decision might appear when 
held up to the image itself, the Burrow-Giles Court in the end 
relied upon a proxy for the qualities of originality it clearly 
viewed the photograph as possessing—not only in the form of 
emphasis on authorial practice, but at a more fundamental 
level, in the form of authorial account of authorial practice.53 It 
suggested, in effect, that a court may deem a work original if a 
persuasive narrative of authorship that “owes its origin” to an 
author is presented. 
The Court’s narrative approach to originality is also 
observable in the portion of the opinion in which it withheld 
judgment about the extension of federal copyright protection to 
all photographs. Specifically, the Court declined to address 
whether copyright would apply to the “ordinary production of a 
  
 50 Farley, supra note 20, at 431-32. 
 51 Unlike many photography cases today, the Oscar Wilde, No. 18 photograph 
was not appended to the Burrow-Giles opinion. It is an interesting thought experiment 
to imagine how the precedential effect of a case might change depending on whether a 
subsequent court sees or does not see a litigated photograph along with the written 
opinion adjudging it. For a critique of the Supreme Court’s later use of appended 
images in its opinions, see Hampton Dellinger, Commentary, Words Are Enough: The 
Troublesome Use of Photographs, Maps, and Other Images in Supreme Court Opinions, 
110 HARV. L. REV. 1704 (1997). 
 52 Farley, supra note 20, at 411 & n.92, 438, 455. Professor Farley identifies 
Sarony’s brief as the source of the language. In fact, the origin of the language can be 
traced back further still, nearly word for word, to Sarony’s complaint in the lower 
court. See Transcript of Record at 4, 6-7, Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 
U.S. 53 (1884) (No. 1071) (setting out the complaint in the Circuit Court for the 
Southern District of New York). The language appears in the second paragraph of each 
of Sarony’s causes of action. Id. While it is not uncommon for courts to adopt litigants’ 
language, this mode of analysis set the stage in originality decisions for close reliance 
on a plaintiff’s authorship narrative. See infra Part II.C. 
 53 Farley, supra note 20, at 426, 432; see also ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, 
THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY 81 (2010) (“According to the Court, although authorship was 
evident in the photograph itself, the narrative supplied by the photographer was vital 
in assisting the Court’s perception.”). 
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photograph” wherein “[i]t is simply the manual operation, by 
the use of . . . instruments and preparations, of transferring to 
the plate the visible representation of some existing object, the 
accuracy of this representation being its highest merit.”54 The 
Court did not provide guidelines for determining when a 
photograph might cease to be an “original intellectual 
conception” and fall into the “ordinary production” category—
which might or might not warrant protection—other than to 
caution against employing too strong an authorial emphasis on 
photographic accuracy in litigation documents.55 But this 
distinction, particularly in a highly representational medium 
like photography, would usually need to occur at the level of 
narrative presented to a court, rather than at the level of the 
formal properties of the image.56 
Although the Court’s reasoning in a subsequent visual 
arts decision, Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,57 is often 
seen as a divergence from Burrow-Giles,58 it is in some ways a 
natural extension of the earlier case. In Bleistein, the Court 
addressed an infringement action in which chromolithographic 
posters advertising a circus had been copied. The Court, through 
Justice Holmes, emphasized “the personal reaction of an 
individual upon nature” and the conviction that “[p]ersonality 
  
 54 Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59; accord Thornton v. Schreiber, 124 U.S. 612, 
613 (1888) (“As we have heretofore decided in the case of [Burrow-Giles], photographs 
are included, under certain circumstances, among the things which may be 
copyrighted.” (emphasis added)). 
 55 As discussed infra Part II, the question of this emphasis would become a 
touchstone for originality debates in photography cases. See Bridgeman Art Library, 
Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (plaintiff’s stated goal of 
accuracy in depiction was fatal to claim). For another example of the lengths to which 
copyright plaintiffs will go to emphasize a lack of intent to capture the underlying 
subject accurately, see Schiffer Publ’g, Ltd., v. Chronicle Books, LLC, No. Civ.A. 03-
4962, 2004 WL 2583817, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2004) (in finding originality, relying 
upon evidence that photographers “did not attempt to replicate fabric swatches as 
precisely as possible,” that they rather “strove to create images that were visually 
interesting,” and noting that “several photographers clearly stated that they never 
compared the fabric swatches to their photographs, precisely because such a 
comparison was unimportant to their goals”). 
 56 The distinction here is akin to that in aesthetic theory between an 
intentionalist approach—where one considers the creator’s intention to create a work of 
art—and formalist theories—where one considers the qualities within the four corners 
of an image. See Farley, supra note 30, at 842-43; Yen, supra note 30, at 253-58. 
 57 188 U.S. 239 (1903). Note that Feist cites Bleistein just once, and not in the 
section where it sets up the standards for originality. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural 
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359 (1991). 
 58 See Jewelers’ Circular Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g Co., 274 F. 932, 934 
(S.D.N.Y. 1921) (subsequent history omitted); Farley, supra note 20, at 456 n.266; 
Miller, supra note 10, at 475; Zimmerman, supra note 17, at 201. 
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always contains something unique.”59 Thus, even a “very modest 
grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man’s 
alone” and “[t]hat something he may copyright” unless barred by 
statute.60 The Court found the posters sufficiently original to 
warrant copyright protection. 
While one cannot help but be bemused by the parade of 
great masters Holmes offers up in his quest to ensure the 
protection of “works of little merit or of humble degree,”61 the 
overwhelming thrust of the opinion is to open wide the door of 
copyright to any work that reflects the imprint of personality. 
Because this might include every work ever produced, the 
opinion reduced, at least in theory, the role of copyright courts 
as art critics.62 Importantly, whatever doubt remained after 
Burrow-Giles as to the protectability of “ordinary” art was, in 
the view of Judge Learned Hand, firmly and resoundingly 
erased by Bleistein.63 The originality of a work under the 
Bleistein paradigm could be equated with its having originated 
with an author or, as Professor Diane Leenheer Zimmerman 
phrases it, “if it is not copied, it is original.”64 
Given Justice Holmes’ institutional commitment to 
minimizing the role of courts in disputes over artistic merit, it 
is perhaps not surprising that unlike the text of Burrow-Giles, 
no part of the Bleistein opinion attempted to explain which 
intrinsic aesthetic qualities of the posters rendered them 
sufficiently original for copyright protection.65 Rather, Holmes 
went out of his way to offer proxies for that determination: 
that, as a default proposition, works of art contain the 
“irreducible” imprint of individual “[p]ersonality”; that there 
was “express testimony” as to the posters’ originality; that the 
posters were copied by the defendant, reflecting their “worth.”66 
As argued above, however, the use of these proxies in fact 
reflects the jurisprudential approach taken in Burrow-Giles. 
  
 59 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 249-51 (referencing Velasquez, Whistler, Rembrandt, Degas, Goya, 
and Manet). 
 62 See id. at 250-52; see also Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The Story of 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Company: Originality as a Vehicle for Copyright 
Inclusivity, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 77, 96-99 (Jane C. Ginsburg & 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006). 
 63 Jewelers’ Circular, 274 F. at 934; accord Gorman, supra note 9, at 1595; 
Yen, supra note 30, at 271. 
 64 Zimmerman, supra note 17, at 202. 
 65 See Yen, supra note 30, at 273. 
 66 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250-52. 
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That opinion’s reliance upon a proxy—in the form of wholesale 
adoption of the plaintiff-author’s narrative—implicitly set the 
stage for Bleistein, in which Justice Holmes could say a great 
deal, but not much about the works at issue.67 
In an influential pronouncement that both reflected68 
and contributed to the liberal treatment of photographs under 
copyright, Judge Hand extended Bleistein’s permissive stance 
on originality to photographs. In the context of assessing 
photographs of jewelers’ trademarks used to illustrate a trade 
circular, he announced that “no photograph, however simple, 
can be unaffected by the personal influence of the author, and 
no two will be absolutely alike.”69 The relevant statute in that 
case, the Copyright Act of 1909,70 was like our current statute 
in that it protected photographs without further qualification 
and, according to Hand, “[t]he suggestion that the Constitution 
might not include all photographs seems . . . overstrained.”71 In 
Judge Hand’s reasoning, accordingly, we see adoption of a 
proxy based on ontology; it is a photograph, and therefore it is 
original. The question thus presents itself: to what degree is 
this notion still valid after Feist?72 
B.  The Feist Opinion  
In the years following Bleistein, the Court had occasion 
to pronounce upon the originality of works before it,73 but it was 
almost ninety years later that the Court re-engaged closely 
with the topic in Feist. As mentioned, it deemed originality to 
be both statutorily and constitutionally required for copyright 
protection and as entailing (1) that a work be independently 
  
 67 The closest the opinion comes to making a judgment about the contents of 
the posters is in its statement that “[t]here is no reason to doubt that these prints in 
their ensemble and in all their details, in their design and particular combinations of 
figures, lines, and colors, are the original work of the plaintiffs’ designer.” Id. at 250. 
This language is fairly noncommittal and is certainly less specifically evaluative than 
the effulgent language used by the Burrow-Giles Court. 
 68 See Farley, supra note 20, at 438-46, for a discussion of the ways in which 
courts in the early aftermath of Burrow-Giles applied the decision. 
 69 See Jewelers’ Circular Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g Co., 274 F. 932, 934 
(S.D.N.Y. 1921) (subsequent history omitted). 
 70 Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076-77 (repealed). 
 71 Jewelers’ Circular, 274 F. at 934-35. 
 72 Courts that have addressed this question understand Judge Hand’s 
viewpoint to have been rejected by Feist. See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales 
U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1263 n.5 (10th Cir. 2008); Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. 
Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 73 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 206-08 (1954). 
1504 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4 
created (that is, not copied) by the author, and (2) that it 
possess a modicum of creativity.74 The originality requirement 
operates at two levels, both of which are of particular relevance 
to photography litigation. First, in order to be eligible for 
copyright protection at all, a work must be sufficiently original 
when judged in gestalt fashion, as a whole greater than the 
sum of its parts.75 Second, originality determines the scope of a 
work’s protection. Unless the work has been copied outright in 
its entirety, originality performs its heavy lifting at this second 
level—that is, at the level of the work’s parts—since an author 
may protect only the original elements of the work.76 An 
author’s ability to obtain relief will depend upon a court’s 
determination that what the second author has appropriated 
are these original elements.77 As we will see, photography 
litigation raises both kinds of claims. 
With respect to the jurisprudential approach adopted in 
Feist, it could be argued, on the one hand, that the Court 
returned to, and therefore condoned, an attempt to engage 
directly with the contents of the work presented to it. That is, 
on a substantive, textual level, the Court freely characterizes 
the listings as “garden-variety” and “typical,” among other 
  
 74 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
Although further discussion is beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that 
determining whether a work is “not copied” raises difficult questions. Drawing on 
theory developed in other academic disciplines, such as musicology and literary 
criticism, a number of legal scholars have argued that the law does not sufficiently 
reflect the complex interconnections and borrowings that have always existed, and been 
encouraged, between texts. See, e.g., Arewa, supra note 17, at 520-44; Julie E. Cohen, 
Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1176 (2007). 
 75 Cf. Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that 
“original works broken down into their composite parts would usually be little more 
than basic unprotectible elements like letters, colors and symbols”). 
 76 Feist, 499 U.S. at 348 (“The mere fact that a work is copyrighted does not 
mean that every element of the work may be protected. . . . [C]opyright protection may 
extend only to those components of a work that are original to the author.”); Cohen, supra 
note 30, at 196 (“[T]he real value of the copyright in a given work is measured by the 
scope of protection it provides to the copyright owner who claims that his or her copyright 
in that work has been infringed.”); cf. Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 
76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 721 (2009) (noting that the extent of copyright protection is 
determined “only down the road in case-by-case infringement litigation”). 
 77 Feist set out the two principal elements of an infringement suit: “(1) 
ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that 
are original.” 499 U.S. at 361. As Professor Jane Ginsburg has pointed out, although 
the Court granted certiorari in Feist to adjudicate the scope of protection for the listings, 
id. at 342, the Court decided that the 1309 names, towns, and telephone numbers in the 
plaintiff’s white pages were not copyrightable at all. Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 342, 349. 
Accordingly, despite the fact that much copyright litigation occurs over the scope of 
protection for a plaintiff’s work, Feist joined Burrow-Giles and Bleistein to create a 
triumvirate of cases dealing with the threshold question of originality. 
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things.78 On the other hand, this commentary is more 
comparative than definitional and, in any event, is framed in 
the negative, ruling out works as unoriginal rather than 
providing an affirmative account of creativity.79  
Feist does not provide substantive guidelines for its 
creativity component, nor does it address how rigorously the 
requirement should be applied to works of authorship for which 
a well-developed jurisprudence already existed, as in the case 
of photography.80 Did the creativity requirement mean that 
photographs must now meet a higher (or lower81) burden in 
obtaining copyright protection, or did the requirement codify 
the existing liberal treatment of photography? The opinion 
could be read to say that, as a descriptive matter, anything 
that can be labeled as “art” inherently possesses the originality 
that is lacking in phonebook-like works. After all, the opinion 
flatly says that the “requisite level of creativity is extremely 
low” and that the “vast majority of works” do “possess some 
creative spark.”82 If the denominator for the “vast majority of 
works” means all works of expression ever produced (rather 
than in each medium), then these guidelines could be 
understood to indicate that a work’s status as a non-fact-driven 
work is a sufficient proxy for originality. In this way, the Feist 
opinion hints at the proxy of ontology discussed below. By way 
of a borrowed hypothetical from Judge Hand, the Court implies 
as much by stating that a theoretical stumbling block for 
protecting a familiar-sounding poem might be a novelty 
problem, not an originality problem.83  
Nevertheless, the Court’s use of unqualified language in 
setting out the originality requirements strongly indicates that 
some form of creativity scrutiny is meant, at least at the 
  
 78 Id. at 362. 
 79 See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 343; Justin Hughes, The Personality 
Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
81, 101 (1998); Miller, supra note 10, at 481. Of course, given its resolution of the case, 
the failure to provide an affirmative account is not surprising. 
 80 Gorman, supra note 17, at 3. 
 81 Professor Douglas Lichtman points out that “[w]ithout discussion, the Feist 
Court adopted the creativity interpretation—interestingly, adding that only a ‘minimal 
degree’ of creativity is necessary, even though the Trade-Mark Cases opinion itself 
contains no such qualifying language.” Lichtman, supra note 15, at 698. 
 82 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
 83 Id. at 345-46 (“To illustrate, assume that two poets, each ignorant of the 
other, compose identical poems. Neither work is novel, yet both are original and, hence, 
copyrightable.” (citing Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d 
Cir. 1936))). The Court assumes counterfactually, for the purpose of this example, that 
novelty is relevant to copyright. 
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margins, to be applied to each work.84 Such a conclusion, 
favoring a unified originality standard,85 is bolstered by the 
Court’s reliance upon Burrow-Giles and Bleistein—precedents 
grounded in the arts.  
If the originality standard is applicable across the 
board, then a method is required for interpreting the Court’s 
implication that some works will, or indeed “must,” fail to 
achieve copyright protection on originality grounds.86 These 
statements, to be sure, are offered in the context of discussing 
the protection for compilations, which raise a particular set of 
considerations. Yet the opinion contains the unmistakable 
theme that any type of work is theoretically open to challenge 
so as to ensure the vibrancy and integrity of the copyright 
regime even if, as Professor Zimmerman points out, the Court 
did not specify what the overall goal of the originality 
requirement is.87 
Writing in the immediate aftermath of Feist, Professor 
Russ VerSteeg expressed concern that the originality 
assessment might call for a medical assessment of the subjective 
processes engaged in by the author to see if they evidenced 
  
 84 The key statements are offered without reservation: the “sine qua non of 
copyright is originality” and “[o]riginal, as the term is used in copyright” requires 
independent creation and minimal creativity. Id. Professor Gorman accepts that Feist is 
applicable to traditional art works and that it calls for “an assessment of the worth or 
merit of a work.” Gorman, supra note 17, at 3. But, he urges that there be “very strong 
reasons to withhold copyright protection from a work on account of its lack of creativity” 
because the “vast majority of works” are original and injecting courts into “highly 
subjective disputes” over aesthetic merits will constitutionalize routine copyright 
disputes. Id. at 3-4. 
 85 See Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 341 (“The Court elected to impose a unitary 
concept of creative originality and declared that the Constitution compels this standard.”). 
 86 The Court, for example, says that there “remains a narrow category of 
works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually 
nonexistent,” Feist, 499 U.S. at 359, and that it is a “[g]iven that some works must fail” 
on originality grounds, id. at 364; see also id. at 358 (noting, in the context of the 
statutory definition of compilations, that “[n]ot every selection, coordination, or 
arrangement will pass muster”). Indeed, the Court closes its opinion with the 
unreserved view that “[a]s a constitutional matter, copyright protects only those 
constituent elements of a work that possess more than a de minimis quantum of 
creativity.” Id. at 363. 
 87 Zimmerman, supra note 17, at 206. Professor Diane Leenheer Zimmerman 
is critical of Feist on this score, arguing that rather than providing an affirmative 
theory of copyright, it only rules out potential theories that had been in the running. 
The Court’s analysis precludes, for instance, a market failure theory, since it forecloses 
copyright claims based on labor-intensive, “sweat of the brow” collections of facts—such 
as compilations of white page listings—that possess undeniable social utility. Id. 
Additionally, the Court in Feist rules out a pure liberty or rights-based theory of 
copyright insofar as it prioritizes the public’s use of communicative works where only 
an “infinitesimal” showing of individuality has been made. Id. at 208. 
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sufficient creativity.88 More recently, drawing on neurobiological 
research, Professor Ralph Clifford also has argued that the 
“creative spark” is not the proper way to determine creative 
output and that the “spark” requirement may be used to deny 
copyright protection to sufficiently creative works.89  
In practice, however, at least in the area of photography 
litigation, courts have not overtly evaluated the internal 
psychological processes engaged in by photographers. 
Furthermore, the vast majority of works have been granted 
threshold protection against copying.90 The next Part fleshes 
out the proxies for originality that courts have utilized in 
contemporary photography disputes.  
II.  ORIGINALITY PROXIES IN CONTEMPORARY PHOTOGRAPHY 
CASES 
Skepticism about the degree of authorship required for 
creating a photograph—a work capable of mass production that 
is mediated by machine rather than human hand—has existed 
since the dawn of the medium.91 As a legal matter, following the 
Court’s decision in Burrow-Giles, virtually every litigated 
photograph has been deemed original at the threshold level for 
purposes of copyright protection.92 Cases challenging 
photographs on originality grounds, however, have persisted. 
These challenges were perhaps fated to reassert themselves in 
the age of digital photography, with its ubiquitous presence in 
contemporary culture and further attenuation of, as Walter 
Benjamin phrased it, the “here and now” quality of an 
original.93  
  
 88 See generally VerSteeg, supra note 17, at 840-43; see also Russ VerSteeg, 
Sparks in the Tinderbox: Feist, “Creativity,” and the Legislative History of the 1976 
Copyright Act, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 549 (1995) (critiquing Feist’s creativity rule and 
suggesting that Congress could overturn it). 
 89 Clifford, supra note 17, at 289. 
 90 See Madison, supra note 10, at 830, 851 (arguing that the creativity 
component does not serve as a gatekeeper and critiquing the appropriateness of 
internal investigations into creative processes). 
 91 See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884); cf. 
WALTER BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility, in 
4 WALTER BENJAMIN: SELECTED WRITINGS, 1938-1940, at 251, 256 (Howard Eiland & 
Michael W. Jennings eds., Edmund Jephcott et al. trans., Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press 2003) (“From a photographic plate . . . one can make any number of 
prints; to ask for the ‘authentic’ print makes no sense.”). 
 92 See, e.g., Farley, supra note 20, at 438-39; Tuchman, supra note 18, at 299. 
 93 BENJAMIN, supra note 91, at 253.  
1508 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4 
One might expect that the contests over originality in 
photography would arise in connection to photojournalistic 
works. For the “factual” nature of those sorts of photographs 
might readily prompt arguments that protection of the images 
would be tantamount to the protection of facts, in violation of 
Feist.94 And, arguably, protection under the principles of 
Burrow-Giles might prove less certain in this context since, 
except in portraiture, a significant number of news 
photographs do not emerge out of the orchestrated scenes that 
Burrow-Giles blessed as “original.” To be sure, disputes do 
occasionally arise out of photojournalistic images. Prior to 
Fairey, a famous assessment of authorship involved frames 
from the “citizen photojournalist” Abraham Zapruder’s film of 
the John F. Kennedy assassination.95 The news-driven context 
of those kinds of images, however, is usually considered later, 
at the fair use stage, rather than in determining whether a 
plaintiff’s photograph is original in the first place.96 
The contemporary cases that continue to press 
questions about originality and authorship in photography 
arise in much less dramatic circumstances. This Part will first 
provide an overview of these cases. It will then present proxies 
that courts have used in making their determinations about 
originality in photographs. 
A.  Cases 
The disputes in photography that cut to the core of the 
originality doctrine commence over images of perfume bottles,97 
hardware equipment components,98 electrical products,99 toy 
  
 94 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991); cf. 
Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 254 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“The mere record of isolated happenings, whether in words or by photographs not 
involving artistic skill, are denied such protection.”); Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59 
(reserving judgment on accurate representations); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 31, 
§ 13.03[B][2][b] (“Liability likewise cannot arise to the extent that the similarity 
between plaintiff’s and defendant’s work is that both graphically reproduce an object 
exactly as it occurs in nature.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 95 See Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
 96 See, e.g., L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1121-22 
(9th Cir. 1997) (considering footage of Reginald Denny beating); Bernard Geis, 293 F. 
Supp. at 146; see also Collette Leland, All’s Fair in Love and News: How the Current 
Application of the Fair Use Doctrine Favors the Traditional Media over Amateur 
Content Providers, 8 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 226 (2008) (arguing that the 
application of fair use disfavors the interests of non-news professionals). 
 97 FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. FragranceX.com, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 2d 312, 315 
(E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 98 Decker Inc. v. G & N Equip. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 734, 738 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
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trains,100 mirrored picture frames,101 Chinese food dishes,102 fabric 
swatches,103 and the like. These types of images, often produced 
for advertising or marketing purposes, feature products shot 
close up, framed with little or no background, and with any 
lighting and shading choices hard for the lay viewer to discern. 
In some ways, the continued originality challenges are 
surprising. After all, these photographs are often created under 
the conditions addressed by the earlier Supreme Court 
precedents. Consistent with Burrow-Giles, for example, the 
subjects are photographed in controlled environments,104 in 
which the photographer can make choices about lighting, focus, 
and the other elements and has the opportunity to “evok[e] the 
desired expression.”105 Likewise, the fact that the purpose of 
these images is frequently to sell products should be no bar to 
protection under the rule of Bleistein.106 Thus, originality in 
these circumstances would seem premised comfortably upon 
the rendering choices made (as to lighting, angle, etc.)107 and, 
often, upon the arrangement of poses and scenery.108  
  
 99 E. Am. Trio Prods., Inc. v. Tang Elec. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 395, 399 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 100 Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 516 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 101 SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 303 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 102 Oriental Art Printing, Inc. v. Goldstar Printing Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 542, 
544 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (subsequent history omitted). 
 103 Schiffer Publ’g, Ltd., v. Chronicle Books, LLC, No. Civ.A. 03-4962, 2004 
WL 2583817, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2004). 
 104 See, e.g., Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1269 (M.D. 
Fla. 2008), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 601 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 
2010); SHL Imaging, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 303. For an argument that much of 
commercial photography requires merely stock lighting and set-up, see Patricia L. 
Baade, Photographer’s Rights: Case for Sufficient Originality Test in Copyright Law, 30 
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 149, 187 (1996). 
 105 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884). 
 106 Bleistein famously states that the fact that works have “a real use—if use 
means to increase trade and to help to make money”—should not prohibit copyright 
protection. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). “A 
picture is none the less a picture and none the less a subject of copyright that it is used 
for an advertisement.” Id. 
 107 See, e.g., Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 519-22 (7th Cir. 
2009); FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. FragranceX.com, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 2d 312, 320-21 
(E.D.N.Y. 2010); Masterson Mktg., Inc. v. Lotus Int’l, Inc., No. 04cv2133, 2008 WL 
667412, at *6-7 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2008); Decker Inc. v. G & N Equip. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 
734, 742 (E.D. Mich. 2006); SHL Imaging, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 311; E. Am. Trio Prods., Inc. 
v. Tang Elec. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 395, 417-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Epic Metals Corp. v. 
Condec, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 1009, 1013 (M.D. Fla. 1994).  
 108 See, e.g., Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 455 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); Fournier v. Erickson, 202 F. Supp. 2d 290, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
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Nevertheless, cases continue to challenge these sorts of 
photographs on originality grounds. Courts, for the most part, 
are reluctant to deny copyrightability in the context in which 
these challenges are typically raised—as defenses to allegations 
of copying by a competitor or by a former client of the copyright 
holder.109 However, these courts often do not ground their 
decisions in any developed, articulated theory of originality. 
The Ninth Circuit, for example, discussed both the 
traditional criteria for originality in photography and the Feist 
criteria in Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., in which it assessed 
photographs of the blue Skyy vodka bottle.110 Some language 
used by the court initially appears to imply that, by interacting 
with one another, these criteria produce an originality 
requirement for photography that is doubly low: “When [Feist’s] 
articulation of the minimal threshold for copyright protection is 
combined with the minimal standard of originality required for 
photographic works, the result is that even the slightest 
artistic touch will meet the originality test for a photograph.”111 
However, the court did not pursue a fine-tuned analysis 
of how the Feist standard bears on the traditional approach; 
rather, it simply drew upon the earlier photography cases to 
supply the content for Feist’s modicum of creativity 
requirement.112 Thus, it referred to Judge Hand’s 
pronouncement about the personality-imbued medium, and 
also to its own precedent, which provided that the “selection of 
subject, posture, background, lighting, and perhaps even 
perspective alone [may function] as protectable elements of a 
photographer’s work” so as to render a photograph 
copyrightable.113 Accordingly, the court articulated a view under 
which Feist’s modicum of creativity requirement codifies the 
prior judicial treatment of photography. It stopped short of 
  
 109 Consistent with Professor Justin Hughes’ analysis, courts’ protection of the 
targets of free riding—corporate entity and individual photographer alike—appears to 
undermine a notion that they are consumed solely by a concern for the Romantic 
author. See Hughes, supra note 79, at 120-21. Separately, while Professor Stewart 
Sterk is surely correct in his intuition that market forces encourage creative risk-
taking by photographers, see Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 
94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1214 (1996), the frequency of fallouts between photographers 
and their clients suggests that the interests of the two groups are not always aligned 
and that copyright protection may play a role as an incentive. See infra Part III.B.1.  
 110 225 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d after remand, 323 F.3d 763 (9th 
Cir. 2003). 
 111 Id. at 1076. 
 112 Id. at 1076-77. 
 113 Id. at 1077 (quoting L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 
1992) and United States v. Hamilton, 583 F.2d 448, 452 (9th Cir. 1978)). 
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stating affirmatively that all photographs will manifest the 
requisite creativity, but to the extent that it all but approves 
the potential authorial contribution of “perspective alone,” the 
decision would seem to suggest that every photograph is likely 
to qualify for protection, since every photograph entails some 
choice of perspective.114  
In Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., Judge Lewis Kaplan, 
who has written a number of important photography decisions, 
attempted to grapple directly with the ways in which a 
photograph might be examined for originality following Feist.115 
First, he drew on familiar principles to proclaim that a 
photograph may display originality in the rendition, which 
relates to the way in which a subject is depicted through choice 
of angle, lighting, shading, filter, exposure, developing 
technique, and the like.116 In an influential statement, he 
declared that “[u]nless a photograph replicates another work 
with total or near-total fidelity, it will be at least somewhat 
original in the rendition.”117 Next is originality in the timing, 
which relates to the capturing of an event by being at the right 
place at the right time.118 Third is originality in the creation of 
the subject, which relates to the planning, conception, and 
arrangement of the photographic scene.119 
  
 114 Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-To-Amateur, 46 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 951, 963 (2004) (“Of course, any given photograph must 
demonstrate . . . selection and [personal] influence [through temporal and spatial 
framing], even if the intent of the photographer is simply to capture factual 
information, not to express an artistic vision. Selection is inherent in the technology; 
one cannot take a picture of everything.”). 
 115 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). These ways are not mutually 
exclusive. Id. at 452. 
 116 Id. (citing 1 HON. SIR HUGH LADDIE ET AL., THE MODERN LAW OF 
COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS § 4.57, at 229 (3d ed. Butterworths 2000)). Judge Kaplan 
acknowledged that his analysis primarily addressed itself to traditional print 
photography and not digital photography, which “may or may not demand a different 
analytical framework.” Id. at 454 n.65.  
 117 Id. at 452. The Nimmer treatise agrees with this general statement of the 
case law. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 31, § 2.08[E][1] (“[A]ny (or . . . almost 
any) photograph may claim the necessary originality to support a copyright merely by 
virtue of the photographers’ personal choice of subject matter, angle of photograph, 
lighting, and determination of the precise time when the photograph is to be taken.”). 
 118 Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 452-53. An example is Alfred Eisenstaedt’s 
famous photograph of a VJ Day kiss in Times Square. Id. at 453. 
 119 Id. at 453-54. Examples of this form of originality are found in Rogers v. 
Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992), and Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 930 (2d Cir. 1914), in 
which the photographers’ “creation” of their respective subjects, a couple holding eight 
puppies and a nude model in a particular pose, were protected from subsequent 
reworking. Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 453-54. The Oscar Wilde, No. 18 photograph 
itself would likely qualify for rendering and subject matter originality under Judge 
Kaplan’s taxonomy, since the Supreme Court noted the particular posing and arranging 
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Judge Kaplan’s metrics are useful in probing which 
aspects of a photograph might make it worthy of copyright 
protection. He goes further, however, and maintains that 
courts should use them as a way of focusing on the “originality 
of the final product”—that is, the photograph itself—rather 
than the decisions that went into creating it.120 This move in 
favor of establishing originality within the four corners of an 
image highlights the absence of guidance as to the substantive 
content of originality from either Congress or the Supreme 
Court. As mentioned, the Court has noted that the quantum of 
originality required is low, and it has made statements about 
what is not required: artistic merit, novelty, or any appreciable 
effort.121 Accordingly, in the absence of specific guidance, courts 
have adopted proxies for their originality determinations, some 
of which are valid and some of which are in tension with the 
reasoning of Feist. These proxies are the proxy of ontology, the 
proxy of narrative, and the proxy of comparison.  
Before moving on to describe the proxies, a brief word 
must be said about burdens of proof. In this article, originality 
is discussed in terms of a determination a court makes. This 
shorthand elides the important point that, by statute, a 
certificate of registration will generally constitute prima facie 
evidence of the validity of the copyright, including proof of the 
work’s originality.122 Thus, as a matter of burden allocation, it 
falls to the defendant challenging a work to rebut the 
presumption of a work’s originality. Defendants sometimes 
attempt to meet this burden by providing evidence that the 
plaintiff has copied from some prior source, and for that reason, 
  
decisions made by Sarony with respect to the subject, costume, draperies, and accessories, 
including even the expression that Sarony had “suggest[ed]” and “evok[ed]” from Oscar 
Wilde. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884). 
 120 Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 451. It has been argued that Feist left unclear 
whether the overarching originality inquiry was into the work itself or the process by 
which it was created. See, e.g., Raskind, supra note 15, at 334. Courts do elide the 
difference between product and production. In Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., the 
court described the Oscar Wilde, No. 18 photograph as a “not ‘ordinary’ photo.” 390 
F.3d 276, 284 (3d Cir. 2004) (en banc). By contrast, the Burrow-Giles Court had 
distinguished that photograph’s creation from the “ordinary production of a 
photograph.” Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59 (emphasis added). 
 121 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345, 358-60 (1991); 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903). 
 122 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2006); see, e.g., Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 17 (1st 
Cir. 2005); Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 268 (2d Cir. 2001); Bibbero Sys., Inc. 
v. Colwell Sys., Inc., 893 F.2d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 1990). Section 410(c) specifies that 
this evidentiary weight is to be afforded where registration is made before or within 
five years after the work’s first publication and that the weight afforded to a 
registration made thereafter is within the court’s discretion. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). 
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the plaintiff’s work should not be presumed original.123 It is not 
entirely clear what should be required to rebut the 
presumption on the alternate ground of lack of minimal 
creativity because, as is argued throughout this article, the 
legal concepts of creativity and originality are highly elusive. 
Further, courts are not always precise in specifying whether 
the burden has been rebutted before launching into discussions 
of originality. Accordingly, this article addresses the proxies for 
originality that courts, viewing the evidence in the record, have 
adopted without necessarily identifying whether the burden 
has shifted at the time of decision. 
The next three sections introduce and discuss three 
proxies for identifying originality in photography litigation. 
B.  Proxy of Ontology 
Employing perhaps the most controversial proxy, the 
proxy of ontology, courts use the fact that a photograph 
exhibits the essential features of a photograph to ground a 
finding of originality. Under this line of reasoning, originality 
becomes a constituent aspect of a photograph. In Decker, Inc. v. 
G & N Equipment Co.,124 for example, the plaintiff alleged that 
the defendants had copied photographs of equipment 
components from its catalog, including closely framed images of 
rubber replacement “shoes” for doorstops. In opposing 
summary judgment, the plaintiff mounted an argument based 
almost entirely on provenance. Other than to stress that it was 
the source of the photographs, the only modicum of creativity 
the plaintiff could identify was that the “products are presented 
in a . . . certain way using lighting and unique positions to 
enhance their appeal and thereby the sales of the products.”125 
The court denied the defendants’ summary judgment motion as 
  
 123 See, e.g., N. Coast Indus. v. Jason Maxwell, Inc., 972 F.2d 1031, 1033-34 
(9th Cir. 1992); Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 668-69 
(3d Cir. 1990); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 908-09 (2d Cir. 1980); 
see also 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 31, § 12.11[B][1][b]. 
 124 438 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
 125 Plaintiff’s Brief In Opposition, at 4, Decker, Inc. v. G & N Equip. Co., 438 
F. Supp. 2d 734, 742 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 05-cv-70128). Similarly, plaintiff’s 
president submitted an affidavit stating that the plaintiff “photographed products in a 
certain way using lighting and unique positions to enhance their appeal” and that its 
original “photographs are prominently featured in its catalogs and are not copies of 
competitors’ photographs and are in no way copies of other pre-existing works. Rather, 
the photographs solely originate with” the plaintiff. Aff. of John Chase, at 2, Decker, 
Inc. v. G & N Equip. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 734, 742 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 05-cv-70128). 
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to the photographs, determining that “to the extent that 
lighting and posing were involved in the photographs, the 
Plaintiff has shown sufficient evidence to support a claim of 
originality in the photographs.”126  
While the posture of Decker, ruling on a summary 
judgment motion by defendants, no doubt contributed to the 
court’s terse discussion, its seemingly perfunctory recitation of 
photographic elements perpetuates a legal discourse in which a 
work’s existence as a photograph—its constitution as a two-
dimensional work in which lighting and perspective are 
perceptible—signals that the work is sufficiently original. This 
signaling function is reflected in pronouncements by both the 
Copyright Office and the circuit courts (although, as discussed 
below,127 a few district courts have, on rare occasion, denied 
protection to photographs on originality grounds). According to 
a Copyright Office representative, photographs receive far less 
scrutiny in the registration process than, for example, works of 
art that are seen as potentially appropriating simple geometric 
shapes.128 Typically, the images for which the Office denies 
registration are X-rays or other medical images whose purpose 
is articulated to be diagnostic rather than creative or 
instructional.129 Indeed, although it later rejected this stance, 
the Copyright Office at one time suggested that, given the 
  
 126 Decker, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 742; see also Reece v. Island Treasures Art 
Gallery, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1202 (D. Haw. 2006) (citing applicable principles 
without explaining what made photograph of hula performance original other than its 
existence as a photograph); Epic Metals Corp. v. Condec, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 1009, 1013-
14 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (same with respect to photographs of construction sites). 
 127 See infra Part II.C. 
 128 Telephone Interview with William R. Briganti, Assistant Chief, Visual Arts 
& Recordation Div., U.S. Copyright Office, in Wash., D.C. (July 20, 2010) [hereinafter 
Briganti Interview]. The decisions of the internal appeals body, the Copyright Office 
Review Board, bear this out: no rejections of photographs appear to have been appealed, 
suggesting that none was rejected by the examiner in the first instance. See Decisions of 
the Appeals Board—U.S. Copyright Office, 1995-2009, IP MALL, http://www.ipmall. 
info/hosted_resources/CopyrightAppeals/fplchome.asp (last visited May 12, 2011).  
 129 Briganti Interview, supra note 128. This stance accords with an 
intentionalist view of art. See sources cited supra note 56. In other contexts, such as Ansel 
Adams’ prints of X-rays recently auctioned by Sotheby’s, one would expect that such 
images would be registered by the Office. See Catalog from Polaroid Exhibit Displaying 
Ansel Adams Print of X-ray of Hand (Lot 460), SOTHEBY’S, http://www.sothebys.com/ 
app/ecatalogue/fhtml/index.jsp?event_id=30084#/r=index-fhtml.jsp?event_id=30084|r. 
main=lot.jsp?event_id=30084&id=460 (last visited Apr. 14, 2011). Professor Jessica 
Silbey’s recent article brings to mind another example. See Jessica Silbey, Evidence Verité 
and the Law of Film, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1257, 1277 (2010) (discussing Lennart Nilsson’s 
iconic “Life Before Birth” photograph of a fetus in utero, published in Life magazine on 
April 30, 1965). Such images would likely be deemed to reflect the requisite 
intentionalist and institutionalist bona fides to qualify as art that is protectable. 
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choices usually reflected in photographs, “there is no issue with 
respect to whether or not a photograph is copyrightable” and 
that “it is possible to consider registration without an actual 
deposit of the work.”130  
The circuit courts echo this position. As expressed in 
Schrock v. Learning Curve International, Inc., a case that will 
be discussed in greater depth below, the Seventh Circuit’s view 
appears to be that photographs will contain sufficient 
originality in the rendering choices they display unless they 
copy other works, either “slavishly” or by mimicking the choices 
expressed in earlier photographs with “total or near-total 
fidelity.”131 This apparently is also the view of the Eleventh 
Circuit132 and, as outlined above in Ets-Hokin, the Ninth 
Circuit. This position, which makes originality in photography 
turn entirely on the first prong of Feist—independent creation 
(or noncopying)—implies that the minimal creativity standard 
will always be met in a photograph. Even if, as this article argues, 
definitive accounts of originality and its creativity component are 
elusive, encouragement for the position that one medium is free 
from these requirements is difficult to square with Feist. 
Nor is it clear that the first prong of Feist, noncopying, 
will play much of a role as gatekeeper. The Seventh Circuit in 
Schrock felt compelled to rule out the possibility that the 
plaintiff’s photographs might be “slavish copies” of the toy 
trains depicted in the images.133 The court derived this 
  
 130 Registration of Claims to Copyright, Group Registration of Photographs, 60 
Fed. Reg. 62,057, 62,058 (Dec. 4, 1995). The Copyright Office proffered this view, which 
it later rejected, in the course of its creation of a group registration option for 
photographs. In connection with a request for comments on a version of the regulations 
that was not ultimately adopted (another version was), the Office stated:  
Photographs are generally copyrightable; an individual selects a camera, 
lens, film, and an image to capture taking into consideration choices such as 
lighting and composition. Since photographs are usually entirely new works, 
for examination purposes there is no issue with respect to whether or not a 
photograph is copyrightable. Therefore, it is possible to consider registration 
without an actual deposit of the work.  
Id. 
 131 Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 519 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting 
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) and citing 
Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)). 
 132 Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1234 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(“Except for a limited class of photographs that can be characterized as ‘slavish copies,’ 
courts have recognized that most photographs contain at least some originality in their 
rendition of the subject-matter.” (citing Schrock, 586 F.3d at 519 and Rogers v. Koons, 
960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992))). 
 133 Schrock, 586 F.3d at 519. The need for the discussion is perplexing given 
that the court had assumed for the purposes of the appeal that the photographs 
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exception from Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp.134 In 
that case, the originality of photographic transparency and 
digital image replicas of old masters’ public domain paintings 
was challenged. It seems reasonable, with facts that involve the 
duplication of one two-dimensional work into another, as in 
Bridgeman, to consider the possibility that the photographic 
transparencies were in fact slavish copies.135 But in Schrock, the 
issue was the traditional role of photography: capturing a three-
dimensional object in a two-dimensional format. The import of 
the Seventh Circuit’s analysis is that, unless a photograph of a 
three-dimensional subject matter has too closely mimicked 
aspects of another photograph, then it will be original.136 
The proxy of ontology raises issues beyond doctrinal 
compliance with Feist with respect to photographs. A recent 
Tenth Circuit case revealed how the powerful attachment to 
photography as a reliably original medium can be used to find 
the originality in “nonphotographs” lacking. In Meshwerks, Inc. 
v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.,137 the question of originality 
arose in the context of computer-generated imagery (CGI) 
depicting digital wire-frame models of Toyota vehicles. These 
digital renderings substituted for product photographs of the 
cars and permitted the advertiser to alter the car’s color, 
features, and surroundings with the click of a mouse.138 
Drawing upon lessons from photography,139 the court held that 
  
qualified as derivative works with respect to the copyrighted toy trains and, hence, by 
definition, were “recast, transformed, or adapted” from the underlying trains in some 
way. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 134 25 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d on reh’g, 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 135 See Butler, supra note 10, at 106 (“When the purpose of the photograph is 
to copy a two-dimensional image, the originality of that photograph deserves closer 
scrutiny than the assertion that all photographs contain some personal influence by 
the photographer.”). 
 136 See Mary Campbell Wojcik, The Antithesis of Originality: Bridgeman, 
Image Licensors, and the Public Domain, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 257, 264-67 
(2008) (discussing application of Bridgeman to three-dimensional context); infra Part 
III.C (discussing staging and shooting of similar scenes). 
 137 528 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 138 Id. at 1260. 
 139 Id. at 1263-64. For a critique of the court’s comparison of the models to 
photographs, see Andrew C. Landsman, Comment, Fender Bender: 3D Computer 
Modeling of Commercial Objects and the Meshwerks v. Toyota Decision, 8 J. MARSHALL 
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 429 (2009); Michael Palumbo, Note, Copyright Protection for the 
Fruits of Digital Labor: Finding Originality in Digital Wire-Frames, 44 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 127, 150 (2009); see also Bryce Clayton Newell, Independent Creation and 
Originality in the Age of Imitated Reality: A Comparative Analysis of Copyright and 
Database Protection for Digital Models of Real People, BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV., 
Spring 2010, at 93. 
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the computer screen images “accurately,” in intent and 
achievement, depicted the real-world cars, and it therefore 
denied copyright protection.140 The images appended to the 
opinion, however, belie the court’s claim that the models 
“depict nothing more than unadorned Toyota vehicles—the car 
as car.”141 They depict a graphic representation of a car in three 
stages—one of pure gridlines, one of gridlines over a solid car 
body, and one purely solid, appearing almost like clay.142 
Although a viewer would think the models represent a car,143 
these images appear far less like an actual car than the shiny 
finished product images that are also appended by the court.144 
Nevertheless, the plaintiff’s images stray from the 
photographic ideal imagined by the court: the images are 
“untouched by a digital paintbrush; they are not depicted in 
front of a palm tree, whizzing down the open road, or climbing 
up a mountainside” and are not original.145 
While the implications of the growth of CGI in many 
different realms are beyond the scope of this article, it is 
sufficient to say that CGI is extending to many areas formerly 
occupied by photography.146 Thus, a principled basis should be 
found for the application of copyright to these areas—more 
than the not-being-a-photograph analysis applied here.  
C.  Proxy of Narrative 
Use of authorial narrative is a species of analysis, 
advocated by some147 and questioned by others,148 that assesses a 
  
 140 Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1268-69. 
 141 Id. at 1265. 
 142 Id. at 1271. 
 143 See Jeffrey Malkan, What Is a Copy?, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 419, 427-
32 (2005) (discussing differences between representation, resemblance, and reproduction 
and arguing that representation “has a figural or metaphorical structure”).  
 144 See Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1272; see also Tushnet, supra note 32, at 33-34 
(discussing aspects of the depictions of cardinals, abstracted from any background, in 
Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exchange, Inc., 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1978), 
which undermine the notion that the images are representations of reality even if, 
because of representational convention, we perceive them as such). The fact that the 
images were later to be filled out and manipulated by the Toyota advertising team, 
Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1266, should not be dispositive of the question of whether the 
plaintiff had made its own creative contribution to the project. 
 145 Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1265.  
 146 See, e.g., Conor Risch, Why CGI?, PHOTO DISTRICT NEWS, Nov. 2010, at 30.  
 147 See, e.g., David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship 
and Originality, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 159 (2001). 
 148 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative 
Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1085-88 (2003) (critiquing intent as principle 
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work by resorting to authorial intent. Author narratives, 
proffered on some occasions by individual author-plaintiffs and 
on other occasions by corporate copyright holders, constitute 
the second proxy courts rely on in challenges to photographic 
originality.149 It is not surprising that this is so. With overt 
aesthetic assessment ostensibly ruled out by Bleistein, a return 
to word-based evidence of originality in the form of testimony 
from the photographer was a likely substitute.150 Indeed, as 
mentioned above, this method was employed in Burrow-Giles. 
Cases in the last twenty years, following Feist, have had to 
walk a fine line, since authorial process could form a part of the 
originality picture, but it could not be phrased so as to indicate 
that sweat-of-the-brow labor outweighed creative input.151 
In Schrock, for example, the Seventh Circuit 
adjudicated a copyright infringement suit by a photographer 
against his former client. Daniel Schrock, who was hired to 
photograph the “Thomas & Friends” toys for promotional 
materials, alleged that the client had used the photographs 
beyond the specified term.152 The defendants countered, in part, 
with the argument that the photographs lacked originality.153 
  
of authorship); Russ VerSteeg, Intent, Originality, Creativity and Joint Authorship, 68 
BROOK. L. REV. 123, 132-33 (2002) (arguing that intent to author, while a factor, should 
not be dispositive for originality determination). 
 149 Professor Clarisa Long has pointed out that given the inexpressible and 
idiosyncratic nature of copyright goods, the cost of rules requiring exhaustive 
description of these goods would outweigh the benefits. Long, supra note 30, at 469; see 
generally Fromer, supra note 76. While this is true with respect to upfront copyright 
claiming, detailed description is clearly part of the litigation dance. Long, supra note 
30, at 500, 510. It is not just with respect to originality determinations that authorial 
narrative may play a crucial role. In the fair use case Blanch v. Koons, the Second 
Circuit placed heavy emphasis on defendant Jeff Koons’ explanation of his purpose in 
using the plaintiff’s photograph in its conclusion that Koons’ work was transformative. 
See 467 F.3d 244, 252-53 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 150 See Tushnet, supra note 32, at 3-6 (discussing the law’s comfort with text 
in contrast to images).  
 151 See Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (framing this tension). 
 152 Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 2009). The 
defendants were the “Thomas & Friends” copyright owner and its licensee who had 
hired Schrock. As is common, the suit arose against the backdrop of a number of 
contractual relationships and the alleged use of the photographs by the defendants 
beyond the term provided by the photographer. Id. at 516. Indeed, the contractual 
relations were so unclear that the court remanded for a determination of whether the 
defendants had secured an implied license to continue using the photographs and 
whether the parties had agreed to alter the default rules relating to Schrock’s right to 
seek copyright for his photographs as derivative works. Id. at 516, 524-25. 
 153 Id. at 517. 
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Citing Feist’s low threshold requirement for creativity,154 the 
court accepted the idea that original expression contributed by 
a photographer often pertains not to the staging of the depicted 
scene but to the way in which an image is rendered.155 But its 
attempt to describe affirmatively what made the photographs 
original was palpably weak. It acknowledged that the 
photographs were “accurate depictions” of the trains, but it held 
that the photographer’s “artistic and technical choices combine 
to create a two-dimensional image that is subtly but nonetheless 
sufficiently his own.”156 As in Burrow-Giles, the court “confirmed” 
this conclusion by invoking the photographer’s description of his 
“creative process in depicting the toys”:  
Schrock explained how he used various camera and lighting 
techniques to make the toys look more “life like,” “personable,” and 
“friendly.” He explained how he tried to give the toys “a little bit of 
dimension” and that it was his goal to make the toys “a little bit better 
than what they look like when you actually see them on the shelf.”157 
While styled as a confirmation, however, this testimony of the 
photographer in fact serves as the sole content for the court’s 
conclusion that the photographs were “subtly but nonetheless 
sufficiently” original. The adoption of language, even 
wholesale, from parties’ court papers is, of course, not unusual 
in litigation. But the mode of reasoning creates a copyright 
system in which an authorship narrative, as a proxy for 
originality, threatens to trump the attributes of the work itself: 
nearly any straightforward commercial image of a toy train will 
be capable of being described, a priori, as “friendly.”158 
This mode of analysis was also visible in a rare instance 
of originality addressed at trial. In Schiffer Publishing, Ltd. v. 
Chronicle Books, LLC, the district court’s findings of fact on the 
issue of originality consisted of the trial and deposition 
testimony of the five photographers who had taken the 
  
 154 Id. at 519. As discussed infra, the court assumed, without deciding, that 
the photographs were derivative works and reviewed them on that basis as well. Id.  
 155 Id. (describing originality in the rendition as “the effect created by the 
combination of [the photographer’s] choices of perspective, angle, lighting, shading, 
focus, lens, and so on” (citing Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992); 
Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 452)). 
 156 Id. Thus they deserved the limited protection afforded to derivative works. 
Id. at 519-20.  
 157 Id. at 519. 
 158 But see SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 310 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (where the court begins its analysis by recounting the photographer’s 
description of his creative process but continues on to a more in-depth discussion of the 
photographs’ formal properties). 
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photographs—in this case, 118 photographs of fabric swatches 
for a book on the topic.159 In particular, the court relied upon the 
testimony as to the processes by which the photographers 
selected and shot the images, including testimony that a 
medium format camera was used “not because it more 
accurately depicted the colors and details” but because, for the 
photographer, “it was just a preference.”160 Likewise, Kodak film 
was chosen over Fuji because it provided “warmer tints.”161  
The court’s conclusion that the originality of the images 
had been demonstrated was couched in the language of 
photographer choice: choice of cameras, choice of film, choice of 
lens, choice of lighting, and choice to take multiple images.162 “In 
the words of [photographer] Joy Shih, the decision of which 
picture to use was made according to ‘which image would project 
what [she] was trying to get [the fabric] to look like.’”163 And the 
court held that these choices were reflected in the images: 
Certain of the photographs evoke the texture of a particular fabric. 
Others have exaggerated or understated the tone and values of the 
colors in a pattern when compared to the original fabric swatches. 
Some photographs are more blurry than the patterns they represent, 
while others display an almost clinical sharpness.164 
The court’s conclusions appear to synthesize the evidence in a 
fair manner, but they do not identify what makes the images 
creative other than the fact that they reflect authorial whimsy 
and that they were not intended to depict, nor succeeded in 
depicting, the underlying fabric swatches too accurately.165 
Indeed, the decisive factor in the court’s analysis was the 
evidence that, unlike in Bridgeman, the plaintiffs’ 
photographers were not striving for accuracy as the goal.166 “In 
fact, several photographers clearly stated that they never 
  
 159 Schiffer Publ’g, Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, LLC, No. Civ.A. 03-4962, 2004 WL 
2583817, at *1-3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2004). 
 160 Id. at *1 (quoting photographer Joy Shih) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 161 Id.  
 162 Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 148, at 1077 (“To say that a work’s creator 
exercised choice as to the contents and presentation of the work is another way of 
saying that the work is original . . . .”). 
 163 Schiffer Publ’g, 2004 WL 2583817, at *7 (quoting photographer Joy Shih). 
 164 Id.  
 165 See generally VerSteeg, supra note 17 (favoring comparative variation test 
over creativity test).  
 166 Schiffer Publ’g, 2004 WL 2583817, at *7-8. 
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compared the fabric swatches to their photographs, precisely 
because such a comparison was unimportant to their goals.”167 
As mentioned above, the Bridgeman case showed that 
even images of venerated works of art might fall victim when 
accompanied by the wrong sort of narrative. That case presents 
difficult questions because the rendering elements typically 
protectable in photographs, such as choice of subject, lighting, 
and composition, were surely present. And yet the court, 
seizing upon an emperor-has-no-clothes insight, determined 
that the finished products were copies of the paintings “as 
exact as science and technology [would] permit.”168 Relying in no 
small part on the Nimmer treatise’s categorical exceptions to 
the protectability of photographs—slavish copying and exact 
reenactment169—the court held that the transparencies were 
“slavish copies” and hence insufficiently creative.170 While 
Professor VerSteeg has argued that the court did not rely upon 
authorial intent in denying protection to the Bridgeman 
images,171 the court’s repeated invocation of the plaintiff’s 
express goals belies this claim. In fact, by repeatedly pointing 
to the plaintiff’s admissions of intent to achieve exactitude in 
its reproductions,172 the court was able to sidestep fraught 
questions about why the nature of the subject matter—public 
domain paintings—should thwart the traditionally protected 
rendering choices. In this way, Bridgeman is the pinnacle of 
judicial decision making premised upon authorial narrative—
or the express disclaimer of one.  
Absence of authorial narrative has also grounded two 
other decisions in which courts have found originality lacking, 
albeit at an early stage of litigation. In Custom Dynamics, LLC 
v. Radiantz LED Lighting, Inc. and Oriental Art Printing, Inc. 
v. Goldstar Printing Corp., the district courts denied motions 
  
 167 Id. at *8. 
 168 Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, 427 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d on reh’g, 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).  
 169 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 31, § 2.08[E][2]. But see Ann Bartow, The 
Hegemony of the Copyright Treatise, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 581 (2004) (critiquing heavy 
dependence by courts on the Nimmer treatise on copyright). 
 170 Bridgeman, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 196-97 (“[T]here was no spark of originality” 
when the goal was to “reproduce the underlying works with absolute fidelity.”). 
 171 VerSteeg, supra note 148, at 137-39. 
 172 See Bridgeman, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 197 (noting that “plaintiff by its own 
admission has labored to create ‘slavish copies’ of public domain works”); see also 
Bridgeman, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 427 (noting that “Bridgeman admittedly seeks to 
duplicate exactly the images of the underlying works”).  
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for preliminary injunctions concerning images of motorcycle 
lighting accessories and Chinese food dishes, respectively.173  
 
 
A photograph lacking originality, 
Custom Dynamics, LLC v. Radiantz LED Lighting, Inc.174 
 
 
 
A photograph lacking originality, 
Oriental Art Printing, Inc. v. Goldstar Printing Corp.175 
  
 173 Custom Dynamics, LLC v. Radiantz LED Lighting, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 2d 
542, 549 (E.D.N.C. 2008); Oriental Art Printing, Inc. v. Goldstar Printing Corp., 175 F. 
Supp. 2d 542, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (subsequent history omitted). In Oriental Art 
Printing, the court also granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ 
copyright claim as to the photographs on the ground that they were not original, 
copyrightable works. 175 F. Supp. 2d at 550. 
 174 Verified Complaint at exhibit 7, Custom Dynamics, LLC v. Radiantz LED 
Lighting, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 2d 542 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (No. 07 Civ. 493). 
 175 Complaint at exhibit A, Oriental Art Printing, Inc. v. Goldstar Printing 
Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (No. 00 Civ. 8374). 
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Both courts reasoned, in part, that the photographs 
“were meant to serve the purely utilitarian purpose of 
displaying examples of [the] product to potential consumers” 
and, citing Feist, held that there was “no ‘creative spark’ involved 
in a purely descriptive picture of a product.”176 In Oriental Art 
Printing, upon which Custom Dynamics relied heavily, the court 
specifically noted the absence of a plausible authorship narrative 
in that “no description of either the lighting or angles employed, 
or any desired expression” was provided.177 Reading these 
decisions, one has the sense that the courts felt they had 
encountered an opportunity to apply Feist in a principled way by 
rejecting a garden-variety photograph. But these images, while 
low-grade, apparently reflected at least some lighting and 
compositional decision making.178 What was missing was an 
authorship narrative the courts deemed sufficient.179 
D. Proxy of Comparison 
Perhaps the closest courts come to grounding originality 
in an image itself is through the proxy of comparison. 
Comparison may take one of two forms: (i) comparison of the 
litigated photograph to other photographs, and (ii) comparison 
of the photograph to the underlying subjects depicted therein. 
1. Comparisons to Other Photographs 
Courts have compared a litigated photograph to other 
photographs submitted by the parties to illustrate the possible 
range of creative expression available under the circumstances. 
In one case, for instance, a court found that “master 
  
 176 Custom Dynamics, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 549 (citing Oriental Art Printing, 175 
F. Supp. 2d at 546-47). The court in Oriental Art Printing also stated that each of the 
potentially protectable elements in the photographs would be barred from 
protectability under the scènes à faire doctrine since they “flow necessarily” from the 
“realistic depiction of most common Chinese food dishes.” 175 F. Supp. 2d at 547 n.3. 
See infra part III.C (discussing scènes à faire doctrine). 
 177 Oriental Art Printing, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 547. The absence of any authorial 
narrative was exacerbated by the failure to attach attractive copies of the relevant 
photographs. See id. (noting that “as presented by plaintiffs . . . each photograph is a 
rather obscure, black-and-white, depiction of a particular Chinese dish”). 
 178 See id. (“From the exhibits submitted, both the lighting and angle appear 
to be equivalent in every photograph.”). 
 179 Note that Professor Michael Madison’s argument, that we should 
reformulate copyright as a knowledge law, involves, at some level, a narrative basis. 
Madison, supra note 10, at 849 (suggesting that artists, lawyers, and courts would have 
to reformulate what they do in knowledge-oriented terms). 
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photographs” supplied by the defendant in an attempt to show 
that the plaintiff’s photographs of mirrored picture frames had 
been shot in a “straightforward manner”180 actually undermined 
that very claim. The court determined that the master 
photographs had “none of the aesthetic elements that ma[d]e 
plaintiff’s photographs attractive. The gilded frames [were] dull 
and the details [were] obscured by shadows or over exposed.”181 
Similar reasoning was applied by another court in response to 
the parties’ submissions of multiple images depicting sniper 
teams in different positions; the court concluded that a “wide 
range of possibilities [was] available” and found plaintiff’s 
compositional choices sufficiently original.182 
Even where it is not clear that a court is referring to 
alternate images in the record, courts appear to engage in 
reasoning that relies upon the proxy of comparison. In 
Mannion, for example, Judge Kaplan examined the photograph 
at issue, which depicted a close-up, upwardly-focused shot of 
basketball star Kevin Garnett wearing white clothing and 
much jewelry against a clouded sky, and he held it to be 
original. Originality in the rendition, which the court anchored 
in the fact that the photograph had not been copied, was 
bolstered by the photographer’s “relatively unusual angle and 
distinctive lighting.”183 Additionally, the photographer’s 
“composition—posing man against sky—evidences originality 
in the creation of the subject.”184 In the absence of any reference 
to other photographs in the record, the only way in which these 
statements may be understood are as statements of comparison 
between the Garnett photograph and others that Judge Kaplan 
had seen during the course of his lifetime (if not in the course 
of the litigation).  
2. Comparisons to the Underlying Subject Through the 
Derivative Work Framework 
Product photographs are sometimes categorized as 
derivative works, that is, works based upon one or more 
preexisting works.185 For courts subscribing to this view, the 
  
 180 SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 311 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 181 Id. 
 182 Bryant v. Gordon, 483 F. Supp. 2d 605, 615-16 (N.D. Ill. 2007).  
 183 Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 184 Id. 
 185 A “derivative work” 
 
2011] ORIGINALITY PROXIES 1525 
notion is that photographs recast and adapt their subject 
matter and that their originality should be assessed through 
the framework applied to derivative works. As usually 
formulated, the test for originality in a derivative work is 
whether the author has “contributed something more than a 
merely trivial variation, something recognizably his own” or a 
“distinguishable variation” from the underlying work.186  
The typical fact pattern driving the cases’ inquiry into 
derivative work status is a business relationship gone awry 
between a photographer and a client—usually a product 
manufacturer whose products the photographer was hired to 
shoot. The defendants in these cases have defended their use of 
the photographs beyond the agreed-upon terms by arguing that 
the photographs are derivative works that do not stand as 
protectable works on their own. This argument is premised on 
the notion that derivative works are subject to a higher burden 
of originality187 or that any originality expressed in the 
photographs relates to the defendants’ products.188 
Application of derivative work status to photographs is 
not without debate,189 but there are several reasons to think 
that the controversy is a red herring, at least with respect to 
the ultimate conclusion of whether originality has been 
  
is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, 
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, 
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other 
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work 
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other 
modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is 
a “derivative work.” 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).  
 186 See L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976) (en 
banc) (quoting Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 
1951) (internal quotation marks omitted); Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, 
Inc., 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927)). 
 187 See Schrock v. Learning Curve, Int’l, 586 F.3d 513, 520 (7th Cir. 2009); 
SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).  
 188 See Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1273 (M.D. Fla. 
2008) (subsequent history omitted). 
 189 Compare Schrock, 586 F.3d at 518 (assuming without deciding that 
photographs were derivative works), and Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 
1068, 1077-81 (9th Cir. 2000) (suggesting that photographs could be derivative works if 
their subjects are copyrightable “preexisting works”) (subsequent history omitted), and 
Latimer, 601 F.3d 1224, 1234-35 (11th Cir. 2010) (suggesting that derivative work 
status would be more consistent with copyright law but refraining from deciding the 
question), with SHL Imaging, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 305-06 (ruling that photographing a 
subject does not create derivative work). Accord 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 31, 
§ 3.03[C] (discussing controversy). 
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shown.190 First, a controversial version of the 
nontrivial/distinguishable variation test, earlier espoused by 
the Seventh Circuit, has now been clarified: Schrock makes 
explicit that derivative works need not demonstrate a higher 
degree of originality than ordinary works.191 Second, courts 
routinely refer to Feist’s originality test as part of their 
analysis,192 so any claim that a modicum of creativity does not 
suffice—or is not necessary—for derivative work authorship is 
misguided. Rather, there is every reason to expect that in the 
determination of courts, creativity-based originality and 
nontrivial/distinguishable variation will rise or fall together. 
The continued reliance by courts on the 
nontrivial/distinguishable variation test undoubtedly reflects 
its attractiveness as a straightforward, judicially applicable 
test for the award of copyright. For this reason, some have 
proposed grounding the criteria for originality in variation 
rather than creativity.193 Nevertheless, unless and until such a 
reformulation officially occurs, there appears to be no reason 
why the originality of a photograph should be assessed 
differently based upon its subject matter.194 The same added 
  
 190 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 31, § 3.03[C][3]; Robert W. Clarida & Robert 
J. Bernstein, Revisiting Derivative Works in Schrock Reversal, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 20, 2009. 
 191 Contra Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(requiring “a sufficiently gross difference between the underlying and the derivative 
work” and that a “derivative work must be substantially different from the underlying 
work to be copyrightable”). Clarifying Seventh Circuit precedent, Schrock stated: “(1) 
the originality requirement for derivative works is not more demanding than the 
originality requirement for other works; and (2) the key inquiry is whether there is 
sufficient nontrivial expressive variation in the derivative work to make it 
distinguishable from the underlying work in some meaningful way.” 586 F.3d at 521. The 
precise language of the Seventh Circuit’s formulation is drawn from the Nimmer treatise. 
See Schrock, 586 F.3d at 520-21; 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 31, § 3.03[A]. 
 192 See, e.g., Schrock, 586 F.3d at 519; ATC Distrib. Grp. v. Whatever It Takes 
Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d 700, 712 (6th Cir. 2005); Dam Things from Den. 
v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548, 563-64 (3d Cir. 2002); Matthew Bender & Co. v. 
West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674, 680 (2d Cir. 1998). The Tenth Circuit has signaled an 
interest in a unitary, Feist-based standard. See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales 
U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1266 n.7 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 193 See, e.g., VerSteeg, supra note 17, at 840-43; VerSteeg, supra note 88, at 588. 
 194 Cf. Gorman, supra note 17, at 7 (“[I]t is strange—given the nature of the 
photographic medium—to insist as a condition of copyrightability that derivative 
photographs be substantial or gross departures from an underlying work. The same 
‘minimal creativity’ standard should apply whether a photographer captures a scene 
from nature, a public domain art work, or an art work protected by copyright.”). 
Likewise, William F. Patry argues that there is just one test for originality, the Feist 
standard, which should be applied to nonderivative and derivative works alike. The 
courts’ continued invocation and proliferation of a multitude of tests for originality in 
derivative works is, he argues, incorrect and unnecessarily confusing in a post-Feist 
world. 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, §§ 3.53, 3.55 (2010). 
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value that a photographer contributes—decisions about lighting, 
angle, and composition, for example—are made whether the 
photographic subject is a thing in nature or an object for sale, 
and it would be patently absurd to ask whether the Obama 
Photograph reflects a nontrivial/distinguishable variation from 
the man himself as the basis for copyright protection.  
The Seventh Circuit’s application of the variation test 
reveals its shortcomings in identifying originality or creativity, 
at least when it comes to the comparison of two-dimensional 
photographs and their three-dimensional subject matters: 
If the photographer’s rendition of a copyrighted work varies enough 
from the underlying work to enable the photograph to be 
distinguished from the underlying work (aside from the obvious shift 
from three dimensions to two195), then the photograph contains 
sufficient incremental originality to qualify for copyright. Schrock’s 
photos of the “Thomas & Friends” toys are highly accurate product 
photos but contain minimally sufficient variation in angle, 
perspective, lighting, and dimension to be distinguishable from the 
underlying [toy trains]; they are not “slavish copies.”196  
Is the comparison that yields the conclusion of “minimally 
sufficient variation” in this quote being made between the 
photographs and the toy trains as seen in appellate court 
chambers, under the conditions the judges happened to view them 
in reviewing the lower court record? Presumably it would be 
possible for the court to view the toys at the right angle, and with 
the right lighting, such that there would be no variation between 
the photographs and the toys other than the change of medium. 
In any event, the bare ability to distinguish between two works 
does not appear to say anything about a work’s creativity. 
III.  TOWARD A THEORY OF COPYRIGHT AND CREATIVITY 
Returning to the question that animates this article: 
after Feist, what should originality analysis in a traditionally 
protected, yet heavily litigated medium such as photography 
consist of? Should courts be looking to weed out unoriginal 
photographs as a means of preserving the integrity of the 
copyright system?  
  
 195 It is worth pausing to reflect that the most obvious variation, the change of 
medium from toy to photograph, is discounted in light of prior precedent. See Schrock, 
586 F.3d at 519 n.3, 522 (citing Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d 
Cir. 1980); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc)). 
 196 Id. at 522 (internal citation omitted). 
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This final section of the article attempts to address 
these questions by evaluating the proxies described above in 
the broader context of originality jurisprudence and 
scholarship and of the photography industry. While originality 
determinations made pursuant to the proxies of narrative and 
comparison are not likely to be demanding, they offer some 
benefit above and beyond those made pursuant to the proxy of 
ontology. Because originality is such an elusive concept, 
however, the threshold requirement for originality should not 
be heightened, as some have called for in recent scholarship. 
While the issues raised by the proliferation of copyrightable 
images are serious, the originality threshold is not the best 
stage at which to address these issues. First, heightening the 
originality bar might distort artistic production or increase 
judicial tastemaking. Second, rigorous policing of the scope of 
protection to which a work is entitled can go a long way toward 
alleviating the need to raise the originality threshold. Finally, 
any proposal to heighten the originality requirement should 
take into account the complex ways in which creators and 
industries finance the production of original, creative works. 
A.  Evaluating the Proxies in the Context of Originality 
Jurisprudence 
Photography is a peculiar copyright beast. On the one 
hand, its creative facets have been touted time and again by 
court after court. On the other hand, the reason for this legacy 
of judicial support is the parade of challenges to its status that 
continues to this day. It is not entirely clear why litigants 
continue to view the lack of originality defense as a viable 
weapon in their arsenal. Lurking in the background seems to 
be the expectation that, as technology increasingly facilitates 
high-quality image taking by amateurs, courts will start to 
conclude that any authorship evidenced in litigated 
photographs is miniscule and fungible.197 Widely known 
repositories of amateur-produced images, such as the website 
Flickr,198 only serve to confirm this viewpoint. Assuming the 
status quo continues, and the originality issue continues to be 
  
 197 Judge Owen colorfully illustrated this concept in seeking, albeit in a 
different context, “more than mere cocktail pianist variations of the piece that are 
standard fare in the music trade by any competent musician.” Woods v. Bourne Co., 
841 F. Supp. 118, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (subsequent history omitted). 
 198  See FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).  
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litigated, does Feist command that courts look to deem some 
percentage of these photographs unoriginal?  
One clear virtue of the current system, from the 
viewpoint of copyright holders, is predictability. Photographers 
and firms holding copyrights in photographs can be fairly 
assured that, should they press a copyright claim, they can 
protect their images from, at the very least, outright copying.199 
If predictability were the utmost goal, efficient policy surely 
would dictate that every photograph be deemed copyrightable 
ex ante, thus sparing litigants and courts the regular need to 
retrace the history of copyright protection for photography and 
to recite the protectable photographic elements of lighting and 
angle when the outcome of these machinations is usually 
known from the start.200 After all, as argued above, courts 
ultimately rely on proxies for originality rather than provide in 
each instance a robust accounting of what makes the particular 
constellation of choices embedded in a photograph original. If 
no such explanation is forthcoming, even for a heavily litigated 
medium, then why not opt for predictability? 
At a doctrinal level, the answer to this question is that 
blanket protection would be incompatible with Feist. The 
opinion can fairly be read to apply outside the confines of its 
own facts and to require minimal creativity for any 
copyrightable work.201 At a deeper policy level, the opinion 
suggests that retaining a shred of doubt as to the protectability 
of a work provides a needed check on the granting of copyright. 
Whether justified on utilitarian or natural rights grounds, 
copyright under Feist presents a system under which artists 
can generally protect their works, yet must be prepared to 
explain their works when challenged.  
Accordingly, the proxy of ontology, whereby originality 
is viewed as an element of a photograph, is at odds with the 
policy of Feist. While Feist does not require much for copyright 
protection to attach at the threshold level, it does seem to 
require something beyond the mere fact of creation through the 
tools of the trade.202 Furthermore, the appellate courts have 
  
 199 Of course, applicable defenses, such as fair use, may permit copying. 
 200 See, e.g., Schrock, 586 F.3d 513; FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. FragranceX.com, 
Inc., 679 F. Supp. 2d 312 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 
444, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 
301 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 201 See supra Part I.B. 
 202 See Harrison, supra note 10, at 872 (“Thus, having [merely] produced 
something is not a useful test of creativity.”). 
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indicated in recent years that some visual renderings will fail 
to achieve copyright protection on originality grounds.203 
Questions about the degree to which copyright should apply 
uniformly across media are difficult and important, but largely 
beyond the scope of this article.204 Nevertheless, some rationale 
should explain the difference in approach.  
For example, the Tenth Circuit in Meshwerks found that 
grayscale digital wire-frame models owed their origin to the 
defendants’ cars and failed to make the grade.205 In Darden v. 
Peters, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Copyright Office’s 
refusal to register a map and website, holding that coloring a 
preexisting census map blue and shading it for three-
dimensional effect were insufficiently creative contributions.206 
In ATC Distribution Group v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions 
& Parts, Inc., the Sixth Circuit found hand-drawn illustrations 
based on photographs of automobile parts not original.207 And 
the Second Circuit, in Sparaco v. Lawler, Matusky, Skelly, 
Engineers LLP, affirmed the grant of summary judgment to 
defendants where an allegation of infringement involved a site 
plan that “sets forth the existing physical characteristics of the 
site,” employing no original features, but only “standard 
cartographic features.”208 Even among more “artistic” works, it 
can be difficult to square the deep-seated deference to 
photographs with assessments in other genres. In Satava v. 
Lowry, for example, the Ninth Circuit all but denied copyright 
protection to a glass-in-glass jellyfish sculpture.209 While the 
courts may be correct in concluding that some of these works 
  
 203 See, e.g., Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 
1258, 1266 (10th Cir. 2008) (digital wire-frame models of cars); Darden v. Peters, 488 
F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir. 2007) (maps and website displaying real estate appraiser 
locations); ATC Distrib. Grp. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 
F.3d 700, 712-13 (6th Cir. 2005) (illustrations of parts closely based on photographs); 
Sparaco v. Lawler, Matusky, Skelly, Eng’rs LLP, 303 F.3d 460, 467 (2d Cir. 2002) (site 
plan incorporating standard cartographic features).  
 204 See generally Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework 
for Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361 (2009); Michael W. 
Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 
AM. U. L. REV. 845 (2006).  
 205 528 F.3d at 1266. 
 206 488 F.3d at 287; see also 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2010) (proscribing the award 
of copyright for “mere variations of . . . coloring”). 
 207 402 F.3d at 712-13. 
 208 303 F.3d at 467. 
 209 323 F.3d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 2003); see generally Morgan M. Stoddard, 
Comment, Mother Nature as Muse: Copyright Protection for Works of Art and 
Photographs Inspired by, Based on, or Depicting Nature, 86 N.C. L. REV. 572 (2008) 
(critiquing lack of protection by courts for works based on natural phenomena). 
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are too tied to their underlying subject matters or too 
minimally creative for copyright, the notion that the election of 
perspective alone in the case of a photograph210 manifests more 
originality than some of the authorial-seeming decisions made 
in these cases is hard to justify. 
By contrast, the other two proxies identified above, that 
of narrative and that of comparison, at least supply 
“something” in support of a claim for copyright protection. 
Specifically, if a copyright plaintiff wishes to press a claim, the 
proxy of narrative permits the something to subsist in an 
explanation of the work from which society, as a tradeoff for 
copyright, may benefit. For example, the narrative offered in 
the Burrow-Giles case itself contributed an elegant account of 
authorial practice in the relatively new medium of 
photography. The photographer’s explanation in Schrock was 
perhaps less flowery, but the narrative it offered—that the 
photographer was trying to make the toy trains look 
“friendly”—is at least a plausible account of the work that can 
be held up in court as a way of backstopping an originality 
finding. This is not to say that courts should, adhering to Tom 
Wolfe’s classic exposition on modern art, The Painted Word, 
cease to look at the image in favor of the narrative.211 Nor is it a 
call to begin dissecting the internal processes of the creative 
mind.212 The claim is only that, as between an assertion that “if X 
is a photograph, then it is original,” and some compelling, or at 
least plausible explanation of what a photographer was trying to 
accomplish, the latter is more capable of being subject to 
scrutiny in litigation, may be more informative to the public, and 
therefore is a more justifiable basis for copyright protection.  
How, then, should we characterize the Obama 
Photograph in the Fairey case? The Associated Press argued 
that Garcia, the photographer, brought his artistic input to 
bear through his “deliberate selection of a specific moment in 
time to capture President Obama’s expression,” his choice to 
use a particular lens and lighting, and his composition of the 
photograph.213 The AP provided further color by way of an 
  
 210 Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(subsequent history omitted). 
 211 TOM WOLFE, THE PAINTED WORD 6 (1975) (describing the way in which 
theory, in modern art, dwarfed the images themselves—“In short: frankly, these days, 
without a theory to go with it, I can’t see a painting.”). 
 212 See Madison, supra note 10, at 851; VerSteeg, supra note 17, at 840-43. 
 213 AP Amended Answer, supra note 4, at 13-14. 
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interview Garcia gave to National Public Radio about his steps 
in taking the photograph: 
I’m on my knees, I’m down low, and I’m just trying to make a nice, 
clean head shot. And I’m waiting. I’m looking at the eyes. I mean, 
sure, there’s focus, and I want the background to be a little bit soft. I 
wanted a shallow depth of field. I’m looking and waiting. I’m waiting 
for him to turn his head a little bit. I’m just patiently making a few 
pictures here and there, and I’m just looking for a moment when I 
think is right, and I’m taking some images as I’m going along, and 
then it happened. Boom, I was there. I was ready.214  
While one can imagine from this description that Garcia’s brow 
did in fact shed some sweat during the creation of the 
photograph, it adequately conveys processes, in support of the 
photograph’s originality, that are at least as creative as the 
selection of a canvas and paints that would factor into a 
protectable painting. Even if “waiting” for Obama to turn his 
head should not be characterized as the creation of a scene 
under Judge Kaplan’s taxonomy, timing and rendering creativity 
appear to be present. Further, the fact that Garcia took more 
than one photograph at the event should not affect the analysis; 
Monet’s haystacks are not judged unoriginal because they 
entailed repeated renderings. While Professor Farley is correct 
that courts do not emphasize explicitly the “plodding” nature of 
the artistry behind some photography215—here, Garcia’s 
“waiting”—acknowledgement of that aspect of photography is 
perhaps implicit in all the first-order challenges to originality 
that are never brought (as in the Fairey case itself).  
The proxy of comparison also remains a valid 
mechanism by which courts may assess photographs following 
Feist. The Supreme Court’s assessment of the garden-variety 
nature of the alphabetization of the white pages was implicitly 
made in a comparative context; one can expect that each 
Justice had encountered a number of these types of 
compilations, and compilations organized according to other 
principles, in the course of his or her lifetime.216 Permitting 
parties to a copyright litigation to challenge or defend 
originality with a bevy of related images squares with the 
competence of courts to make comparative judgments, which 
  
 214 Id. at 28 (quoting National Public Radio Interview with Garcia (Feb. 26, 2009)).  
 215 Farley, supra note 20, at 449. 
 216 See Miller, supra note 10, at 487 n.180 (making this point). 
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they do regularly in the context of infringement analyses.217 
Furthermore, given the ways in which professional 
photographers work—taking multiple (and sometimes 
hundreds or thousands) of photographs of a scene—the proxy of 
comparison may come closest to allowing a court to distill the 
creative input of the photographer. When courts attach a copy 
of the challenged image to their decisions along with others 
that they relied upon by way of comparison, that contrast 
affords later litigants the benefit of a graphic definition of 
originality (in the way that the Oscar Wilde, No. 18 photograph 
serves as a visual exemplar of originality).  
Thus, continued adoption of this proxy is appropriate, 
but with one caveat. As discussed above, in the case of 
comparisons made in the derivative work context, courts ask 
whether there is any nontrivial or distinguishable variation 
between a photograph and the subject matter depicted. In so 
doing, they are engaging in an exercise with a foregone 
conclusion, at least with respect to the ordinary transcription of 
three-dimensional objects into two-dimensional photographs. 
Variation and hence originality will be found. Thus, this 
particular comparative proxy is at odds with Feist. 
In the end, obligating a copyright plaintiff to defend a 
challenge to originality, either by narrative or by visual 
comparison or by some other means, will likely prove an easy 
burden to bear. This is not a new test to meet; rather, as has 
been described, parties and courts are already engaging in 
these approaches to litigation. This article encourages 
transparency in the way in which originality is assessed so as 
to contribute to ongoing conversations about the social 
tradeoffs for the exclusive rights afforded by copyright. 
B.  Scholarly Calls to Raise the Originality Threshold 
While this article calls for a more transparent—if not 
content-rich—application of originality principles to 
photography and other works that may be located on the more 
“artistic” end of the continuum, others recently have gone 
further and called for a heightening of the creativity 
  
 217 They do this in the course of asking whether two works are substantially 
similar. See, e.g., Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 
63 (2d Cir. 2010) (setting out the elements of a copyright infringement claim); see also 
Miller, supra note 10, at 487 (advocating thick factual record to be presented to a court 
with a range of examples, but suggesting review more akin to nonobviousness 
assessment in patent law). 
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requirement. This group, rather than eschewing a 
determination of the merits of a litigated work, sees promise in 
the possibility that courts might openly engage with the level of 
a work’s achievement. Specifically, they embrace the creativity 
component of originality as a meaningful tool by which to yield 
a more optimal level of socially valuable works—even if the 
policy behind that Court-created tool has not been clearly 
elucidated.218 For Professor Zimmerman, for example, Feist, 
through its insistence upon a modicum of creativity, can be 
read as a corrective halt on the tradition of expansive readings 
of originality under Bleistein, under which “if it is not copied, it 
is original.”219 She proposes that perhaps a more exacting 
approach to the application of the originality doctrine, as a 
proxy for quality, is called for.220 
This suggestion is taken up in the scholarship of 
Professors Joseph Miller and Jeffrey Harrison. These scholars 
explicitly argue for a heightened creativity demonstration—
that is, something above and beyond what is required now for 
the full panoply of copyright rights to attach—that could be 
brought about by a modified legal test or a modified application 
of the present one. The precise proposals vary in the specifics 
but share core commonalities. Drawing on the “nonobviousness” 
requirement in patent law, Miller would premise an originality 
determination on the degree to which a work is a “departure 
from that which is conventional, routine, or pedestrian” in the 
particular genre.221 Harrison proffers a “modicum-times-2” 
standard that would require “more than minimal expertise, 
skill, taste, or judgment” and that the work “be capable of being 
distinguished from other ordinary objects.”222 He would also 
adapt the concept of authorship to require some degree of 
“preconception.”223  
These proposals aim to remedy two types of perceived 
ills. The first set of harms consists of a range of costs imposed 
by copyright. It is widely acknowledged that copyright has 
permeated many facets of life in the digital age; this 
  
 218 Zimmerman, supra note 17, at 206. 
 219 Id. at 202. 
 220 Id. at 212. For a comparison of the application of originality standards in 
non-U.S. jurisdictions, see Elizabeth F. Judge & Daniel Gervais, Of Silos and 
Constellations: Comparing Notions of Originality in Copyright Law, 27 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 375 (2009). 
 221 Miller, supra note 10, at 477; id. at 464, 486-87. 
 222 Harrison, supra note 10, at 867 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 223 Id. at 859. 
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phenomenon both hovers as a perpetual threat of liability for 
downstream users and may deter would-be authors.224 Likewise, 
it is argued, copyright litigants do not internalize the full cost of 
disputes that are often of purely private significance with little 
associated public benefit of the sort copyright was designed to 
promote.225 A heightened threshold for originality would address 
these problems by reining in—up front—the number of works 
that become subject to copyright in the first place.  
The second type of harm addressed in this scholarship is 
a structural weakness. The current regime, it is said, does not 
incentivize the creation of the optimal number of truly original 
works since authors likely “aim low” in their creative endeavors 
as a result of the minimal creativity demanded of them.226 The 
modifications proposed, they contend, would have the salubrious 
effect of encouraging authors to achieve greater creative heights 
(to thereby advance knowledge and learning) and, at the same 
time, would more readily justify the social costs of awarding the 
full slate of copyright exclusions and penalties. 
These proposals raise important policy questions, which 
will be evaluated for their potential effects at the time of a 
work’s creation and at the time of enforcement.  
1. Effects at the Time of Creation 
The proposals described above embrace an incentive-
based theory of copyright with an added twist: not only can 
copyright encourage the creation of works in the neighborhood 
of being creative,227 but manipulation of the quantum of 
creativity required will affect the level of creativity achieved. 
The implicit idea is that anxiety about whether a particular work 
would be protected, or the extent of its protection, will propel 
artists to reach for greater heights. And, having reached these 
heights, copyright would reward them for their achievements.  
As an initial matter, there is reason to question the 
proposition that artists aim low because the originality 
threshold is low. The scholars advocating this position present 
  
 224 Id. at 859 & n.41; Miller, supra note 10, at 457-59, 464, 466-68; see also 
Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 17, at 1508, 1518-20. 
 225 Harrison, supra note 10, at 855-56 (distinguishing between distributive 
and allocative interests); see also Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 17, at 1512, 1518. 
 226 Harrison, supra note 10, at 857-58, 873-77; Parchomovsky & Stein, supra 
note 17, at 1506, 1517; cf. Miller, supra note 10, at 463-64. 
 227 Cf. Cohen, supra note 74, at 1152 (noting the distinction between creativity 
and mere production); Harrison, supra note 10, at 865, 872 (same). 
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no evidence that this is the case. With respect to the current 
professional photography market, moreover, there is reason to 
believe that financial considerations exert their own pressures 
on photographers to produce high quality works of authorship. 
Many sectors of the professional photography industry are 
undergoing significant structural change, with the traditional 
business models no longer seen as viable.228 In the face of pools of 
talented amateur photographers, stock houses that accumulate 
and supply low-cost, serviceable photographs for many needs, and 
reduced opportunities for paid work in the print media, market 
forces already encourage photographers to distinguish themselves 
creatively in order to attract clients and paying work.229  
Furthermore, even assuming that a ratcheting up of the 
originality requirement would alter the behavior of authors, we 
should exercise caution in constructing a system in which 
adherence to a copyright rule is a foremost consideration 
during the process of artistic creation.230 Authors must already 
be increasingly conscious of one thread of copyright—the need 
to steer clear of infringement. There is a serious question about 
whether the further shaping of primary behavior through this 
sort of legal rule is desirable.231 It is possible to have too much 
creativity; strange and radical departures from convention, 
undertaken merely for the sake of ensuring copyright 
protection, do not necessarily advance science and learning to 
the optimal degree.232 
  
 228 The comments are legion. See, e.g., Neil Burgess, For God’s Sake, Somebody 
Call It!, EPUK (Aug. 1, 2010), http://www.epuk.org/Opinion/961/for-gods-sake-somebody-
call-it; David Jolly, Lament for a Dying Field: Photojournalism, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/10/business/media/10photo.html; Jay Kinghorn, 
Rethinking Your Business Model, STRICTLY BUSINESS BLOG (May 25, 2011), 
http://www.asmp.org/strictlybusiness; Holly Stuart Hughes & Conor Risch, How Art 
Buyers Find Photographers Now, PHOTO DISTRICT NEWS, Jan. 2010, at 36; Thomas 
Werner, Photography Isn’t Dead, The Business Model Is, STRICTLY BUSINESS BLOG (May 
27, 2011), http://www.asmp.org/strictlybusiness. 
 229 See, e.g., Stephanie Clifford, For Photographers, the Image of a Shrinking 
Path, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/30/business/media/ 
30photogs.html (describing financial pressures on established professional photography 
paths). 
 230 I want to thank Kathryn Judge for her helpful insight on this point. 
 231 Parchomovsky and Stein argue that a benefit to their proposal of a tiered 
system under which the most original works would receive both the greatest freedom 
from liability in drawing upon preexisting works and also the strongest rights to 
pursue downstream infringement, is that it “will prompt authors to focus on the 
originality factor.” Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 17, at 1517. 
 232 See Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1441, 1479-83 (2010) (arguing that with respect to artistic endeavors, society 
generally tolerates less “newness” than it does with respect to scientific endeavors); 
Madison, supra note 10, at 823 (“More—more creativity, more creative goods, more 
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2. Effects at the Time of Litigation  
Even setting aside the degree to which changing the 
legal standard might distort artistic production, the proposals 
raise the related issue of the desirable level of uncertainty that 
accompanies an infringement suit. As this article has argued, 
Feist does contain the seed of an approach to copyright under 
which the absence of guaranteed protection serves as a check 
on the system. By ruling out blanket protection for any 
medium, including photography, the opinion does inject some 
degree of uncertainty into copyright litigation—albeit 
uncertainty that typically can be remedied by an appropriate 
accompanying narrative or comparative evidence of originality. 
By contrast, the proposals of Miller and Harrison to 
raise the originality threshold would introduce a greater level 
of uncertainty into the current litigation regime. This 
uncertainty would result from an increased lack of 
predictability as to whether a work was creative enough to 
merit copyright protection at all. Given the elusiveness of 
originality as a legal concept, the notion that the system could 
rationally articulate what is pedestrian or what is especially 
original—without deferring to the internal preferences of the 
decision maker—is difficult to comprehend.  
Miller offers the example of a CT-scanned photograph of 
a rubber duck toy—“radiology art”—as the sort of thing 
copyright should protect in contrast to the Obama Photograph.233 
Professors Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein cite Alice 
Randall’s book The Wind Done Gone as the kind of work they 
view as highly original.234 But no principled basis for these 
determinations is clearly delineated. Furthermore, producing an 
attractive, high quality work where the range of authorial 
discretion is narrow—such as, perhaps, a press photograph at a 
political event—may support, rather than undermine, a claim of 
originality. For, many authorial decisions have often contributed 
to even a seemingly mundane photograph.235  
  
creators—is not necessarily better; more is merely different.”); Parchomovsky & Stein, 
supra note 17, at 1522 (“We do not dispute that originality has an optimal amount.”). 
 233  See Miller, supra note 10, at 491 (“It strikes me, at the outset, as 
unconventional expression (in great contrast to Mr. Garcia’s photo of then-Senator 
Obama).”). 
 234  Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 17, at 1529-31 (asserting that Randall’s 
book is “brimming with originality” and that the author “attempted—successfully—to 
break new literary ground”). 
 235 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 214. Photographer Ryan Matthew 
Smith’s images for a new book on culinary techniques involved a series of creative decisions:  
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In any event, as this article has argued throughout, 
unless the system is revised explicitly to permit aesthetic 
judgments by courts on the originality question,236 courts will 
continue to use proxies for that assessment. Thus, rather than 
necessarily yielding a better crop of creative works, a heightened 
standard is likely to promote more elaborate narratives and 
more controversies over the appropriate comparative specimens 
offered in a litigation setting. This, if anything, is likely to result 
in more outcomes determined by judicial subjectivity. 
Two additional reasons exist for enforcing, but not 
heightening, the requirement for originality. These will be 
taken up in the remaining subsections. The first is that the 
proposals to raise the requirement do not take full account of 
the way in which originality already functions—at the level of 
scope of protection—to allow downstream authors to operate, to 
a meaningful degree, free from the reach of an earlier 
photographer’s copyright. The second is that heightening the 
originality threshold inadvertently may cause economically 
sustaining work to evaporate; if this is the case, creative 
endeavors—the sort that Miller, Harrison, Parchomovsky, and 
Stein would like to incentivize—that depend on that income 
may not come to fruition.  
C.  Scope of Protection Safety Valve 
One argument sometimes proffered against protecting 
photographs of common scenes or mundane items is that the 
copyright holder will then be in a position to harass others who 
  
The project required Smith to figure out creative ways to shoot a wide range 
of subjects. His shots of root crops growing underground were inspired by 
drawings of tree root structures he had seen. He also made those images by 
combining multiple shots. The challenges were keeping the lighting 
consistent, and propping up greens with toothpicks and tweezers as they 
wilted under the lights, Smith says. For the images of liquids and pours, he 
used Broncolor 3200 w/s strobes (and power packs) capable of firing at 
1/9000th of a second, and some trial and error. “Getting the perfect splash or 
pour is all about timing,” he says, explaining that he often threw some liquid 
with one hand and triggered his camera and strobes with the other. 
David Walker, Picture Story: An Accidental Adventure in Food Photography, PHOTO 
DISTRICT NEWS (May 25, 2011), http://www.pdnonline.com/pdn/features/Picture-Story-
An-Ac-2932.shtml. 
 236 As mentioned above, a number of scholars have argued that courts are 
already engaging in aesthetic determinations, even if the courts are not labeling them 
as such. See supra note 30. 
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independently photograph similar subjects.237 For example, 
several circuit courts have expressed concern that product 
manufacturers licensing the production of derivative works 
could find themselves prevented from the further licensing of—
and possibly even liable for the infringement of—photographs 
of their own copyrighted works.238 To defuse this potential 
problem, courts must be rigorous in circumscribing the 
conditions under which a defendant can be held liable for 
staging and/or shooting a similar scene.239  
Striking the right balance in the infringement context is 
crucial since the principles derived from these cases could affect 
the copyright status of the billions of unlitigated photographs 
that depict common scenes and setups. Given the highly 
representational nature of photography,240 the notion that the 
average snapshot in front of the Statue of Liberty might 
theoretically infringe a similar photograph seen elsewhere by 
the snap-shooter would not be an ideal copyright policy. Aware 
of what rests in the balance, courts already perform reasonably 
well in determining whether two different, but similar, 
photographs lead to a determination of infringement of one by 
the other. 
1. General Principles  
The seminal Supreme Court decisions do not provide 
direct guidance on how close a subsequent photograph may 
come to an earlier photograph since they addressed threshold 
copyrightability problems. Once it was decided that Sarony’s 
photograph was original, no further work was undertaken to 
  
 237 Custom Dynamics, LLC v. Radiantz LED Lighting, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 2d 
542, 549 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (expressing concern that finding photographs copyrightable 
would allow plaintiff to “corner the market on advertising aftermarket motorcycle 
lighting accessories by copyrighting purely descriptive pictures of its wares”); Oriental 
Art Printing, Inc. v. Goldstar Printing Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 542, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(subsequent history omitted); see also Ginsburg, supra note 148, at 1077 (discussing 
this argument). 
 238 Entm’t Research Grp. v. Genesis Creative Grp., 122 F.3d 1211, 1224 (9th 
Cir. 1997); Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 303-04 (7th Cir. 1983); Durham 
Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910-11 (2d Cir. 1980).  
 239 SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 311 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); cf. Gorman, supra note 9, at 1591-92, 1598-99 (discussing distinction 
between exact duplication and re-staging). 
 240 See GAINES, supra note 46, at 67 (contrasting written composition and 
photography and remarking that “two different men may very well produce identical 
photographs using the same apparatus identically positioned”). 
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probe the nature of the defendant’s 85,000 lithographic 
copies—they were infringing. 
 
 
The Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co.’s lithograph,  
Courtesy of the Library of Congress 
 
The Court was not asked to decide, for example, 
whether another photographer would have been permitted to 
pose and photograph Oscar Wilde in a similar fashion or how 
close such a subsequent photograph could have come to 
Sarony’s image before it infringed.241 
  
 241 This did not prevent the defendant in Burrow-Giles from making an 
argument, along these lines, that should the Court affirm the copyrightability of the 
photograph, Oscar Wilde would not be permitted to hire a painter to paint him in a 
similar setting. See Statement and Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 15, Burrow-Giles 
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (No. 1071). 
2011] ORIGINALITY PROXIES 1541 
The general consensus is that exact reconstruction of an 
earlier copyrighted photograph is infringement.242 How should a 
court determine if a subsequent photograph infringes an earlier 
one? While there is a gray area here, courts are better equipped 
institutionally to decide this question—of whether a later 
photograph appropriated original material from an earlier one—
than the first-order originality status of the earlier one; after all, 
courts are institutions designed to balance and compare.243 
Proxies play a role at this phase of litigation as well. 
Comparative techniques are clearly at the heart of the 
infringement analysis. But even authorial narrative may help 
to define the scope of protection to which a copyright plaintiff’s 
work is entitled. Sahuc v. Tucker, for example, involved two 
photographs of the St. Louis Cathedral at Jackson Square in 
New Orleans and the claim that the later one infringed the 
earlier one.244 The plaintiff proffered a narrative about the way 
he sought a “spectral,” “mysterious,” and “timeless” quality of 
the setting in his black-and-white photo.245 He testified that “‘it 
all works,’ that there is ‘no one thing’ and ‘all of the elements’ 
are important.”246 According to the court, however, that 
narrative sufficiently departed from the second photographer’s 
testimony that he photographed in color so as to provide the 
“viewer with more information.”247 The second photograph 
focused primarily on the Cathedral as its “center of interest,” 
aiming to capture it “under optimum conditions” and to provide 
a visual path of “rising up.”248 Taking all of this into account, 
  
 242 See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 31, § 2.08[E][2]; Malkan, supra note 
143, at 446. The court in SHL Imaging suggested that certain reconstructions would 
constitute infringing derivative works. See 117 F. Supp. 2d at 306 (remarking that 
“[r]e-shooting an earlier photographic work with some alteration of the expressive 
elements is an[] example” of derivative authorship since “the nature of photographic 
authorship would have been recast, adapted, or transformed”). 
 243 Cf. Malkan, supra note 143, at 448 (questioning how one should assess the 
respective contributions to an image of a beautiful subject matter as between the first 
photographer and any subsequent photographers and suggesting that it is the “level of 
original authorship in the earliest photograph [that] is the wild card”). 
 244 300 F. Supp. 2d 461, 463 (E.D. La. 2004) (subsequent history omitted). 
 245 Id. at 463, 465. (The court does not use quotation marks with respect to 
these descriptions, but does cite the plaintiff as the source of them.) 
 246 Id. at 465 (quoting plaintiff). 
 247 Id. at 466. (The court does not use quotation marks with respect to this 
description, but does cite the defendant as the source of them.). Coming closer to the 
plaintiff’s narrative, the defendant also described his photo as “ethereal, unearthly, 
spiritual, and mysterious.” Id. (The court does not use quotation marks with respect to 
these descriptions, but does cite the defendant as the source of them.) 
 248 Id. (quoting defendant) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
1542 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4 
the court held that there was no infringement.249 Accordingly, 
reliance on a plaintiff’s narrative account of originality does not 
necessarily entail a victory for the plaintiff. 
Recent case law and scholarship, however, have 
questioned the utility of some of the tools courts use to perform 
this kind of analysis. These tools, however, are essential to 
upholding the principles of Feist. Although the precise 
formulation of the test for copyright infringement varies among 
the circuits and in different contexts, copyright protection is 
generally available only to the extent that the allegedly 
infringing work is substantially similar to the protectable 
original elements in the earlier work.250 Two doctrines operate to 
limit the scope of a work’s protection: merger and scènes à faire.251  
The merger doctrine is an extension of the 
idea/expression dichotomy, under which copyright protection 
applies only to the expression of ideas, not to the ideas 
themselves.252 The merger doctrine takes this notion to its 
logical conclusion: if an idea can be expressed in only one way, 
then the expression of that idea is said to merge with the 
idea.253 In such a case, the expression cannot be protected by 
copyright because it would give an author a monopoly on the 
underlying idea.254 Accordingly, others may freely copy merged 
  
 249 Id. at 467. 
 250 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (“To 
establish infringement, two elements must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid 
copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.”); see, 
e.g., Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 
2010) (setting out substantial similarity test).  
 251 Although I discuss these doctrines at the scope of protection phase, in some 
circuits they are invoked at the copyrightability phase. See generally Andrew B. Hebl, 
A Heavy Burden: Proper Application of Copyright’s Merger and Scenes a Faire 
Doctrines, 8 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 128 (2007) (analyzing the treatment of 
these doctrines, and the corresponding burdens of proof, across the circuits). It is not 
uncommon to see the doctrines invoked where, as discussed above, a defendant has 
challenged the plaintiff’s work as garden variety. See, e.g., Schrock v. Learning Curve 
Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 522 n.5 (7th Cir. 2009); Oriental Art Printing, Inc. v. Goldstar 
Printing Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 542, 547 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (subsequent history 
omitted). 
 252 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
 253 Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707-08 (2d Cir. 
1992); Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 606 (1st Cir. 
1988). Articulation of the rule, however, is far easier than the application of it. As 
Professor Hughes puts it, “the doctrine’s indeterminacy comes from trying to apply an 
either/or dichotomy—with draconian implications—to a multilayered world.” Hughes, 
supra note 15, at 91. 
 254 Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 
1971); Michael D. Murray, Copyright, Originality, and the End of the Scènes à Faire 
and Merger Doctrines for Visual Works, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 779, 788 (2006) (citing 
Educ. Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 539 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
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expression. To illustrate, the First Circuit upheld the 
application of the merger doctrine in an infringement dispute 
over candle fragrance labels in which the defendant-
competitor’s photographs of eucalyptus, cranberry, and other 
vegetation were similar to those of the plaintiff.255 It explained 
that “there were few associated expressions, of which the most 
obvious was a realistic representation of the fruit or flower at 
issue” and that the defendant could use “the same subject 
matter on its labels, even if the genesis for [its] choice of 
subject matter was [the plaintiff’s] labels.”256 
The scènes à faire doctrine has come to refer to stock 
phrases, events, themes, and characters that are commonly 
employed in the context of a particular kind of work, such as 
“the cars in a car chase, the kiss in a love scene, [or] the dive 
bombers in a movie about Pearl Harbor.”257 There are several 
purposes undergirding this doctrine. First, there is a fairness 
argument that stock themes and conventions belong in the 
public domain.258 Another purpose is evidentiary; given their 
prevalence in the culture, it would be impossible, in a copyright 
infringement case, to determine whether one work had copied 
from another or had simply drawn upon familiar human 
experiences.259 Finally, scènes à faire are seen as “essential to 
the presentation of the subject matter of [a] work” and 
accordingly lack originality.260 Some scholars have described 
  
 255 Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 32 n.1 (1st Cir. 
2001).  
 256 Id. at 36. However, the court discerned limitations in the merger doctrine’s 
application to this case, where there were “sufficient details in th[e] photographs to 
make them unique.” Id. According to the court, the merger doctrine would not have 
allowed the defendant to scan the plaintiff’s labels into a computer and “reproduce[] 
them exactly,” and it might also have prevented the defendant from taking its own 
photographs of the photographic subjects arranged “nearly identical[ly]” to the 
plaintiff’s arrangement. Id. 
 257 Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 258 See Scott-Blanton v. Universal City Studios Prods. LLLP, 539 F. Supp. 2d 
191, 201 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Indeed, the public domain would have a scant selection if 
stock settings such as the movie theatre, the kitchen, Las Vegas, a church picnic or a 
club were subject to copyright protection.”); Murray, supra note 254, at 794 (citing 
several cases). 
 259 See Lichtman, supra note 15, at 739; Murray, supra note 254, at 794. 
 260 Murray, supra note 254, at 794. Note, however, that some view scènes à 
faire as protectable expression and others do not. Compare Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 361 F.3d 312, 319 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[E]xpressions 
not protectible because they follow directly from unprotectible ideas are known as 
scènes à faire . . . .”), with Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 315 F.3d 1039, 
1042-43 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Labeling certain stock elements as ‘scènes à faire’ does not 
imply that they are uncopyrightable; it merely states that similarity between plaintiff’s 
and defendant’s works that are limited to hackneyed elements cannot furnish the basis 
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scènes à faire as “infrastructural, for they constitute the 
‘elements of creation, a vocabulary needed to create a work.’”261 
The scènes à faire doctrine often serves as a convenient 
catch-all of elements, without sufficient attention paid to the 
nature of the element as it relates to the genre of work under 
consideration. This is particularly true in the case of 
photography. Some courts seem prepared to invoke this 
doctrine, but to limit consideration of it to what may be thought 
of as the “plot” of the photograph, that is, to those aspects that 
relate to what the photograph purports to be about. For 
example, one court identified the portrayal of a dancer’s motion 
and dress, associated with a traditional type of dance, as scènes 
à faire.262 In another case, where two photographs of the same 
dinosaur fossil were shot surrounded by sand, the court held 
that sand was a scène à faire in that “it is the obvious choice of 
background for the [f]ossil.”263 
In order to translate this doctrine to the photographic 
context, however, courts should consider the stock and trade 
elements of photography. In particular, if, as is frequently 
stated, creativity in photography relates more to the depiction 
of subject matter than to any claim to the photographic subject 
itself, then defendants should be permitted to adopt any angle, 
lighting, or composition technique that is routinely used in 
professional photography without fear of infringement. Some 
courts have signaled that they are willing to take such choices 
into consideration when adjudicating alleged infringement. In 
one dispute, where the two fashion photographs at issue each 
portrayed a woman’s legs and handbag in a bathroom stall, the 
court was inclined to include as scènes à faire some of the 
choices traditionally associated with photography, such as 
angle and focus:  
[I]t is standard for the photographer to take such a photograph from 
or near the floor, and it follows that a portion of the floor closest to 
the camera might be out of focus. A natural consequence of that 
positioning is also, often, a head-on view of the toilet. In addition, a 
  
for finding substantial similarity.” (citing 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 31, 
§ 13.03[B]4 at 13-75)).  
 261 Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV. 
39, 61 (2008) (quoting Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright: The Scènes à Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA. 
L. REV. 79, 114 (1989)). 
 262 Reece v. Island Treasures Art Gallery, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1207 (D. 
Haw. 2006). 
 263 Psihoyos v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 409 F. Supp. 2d 268, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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photographer of such a scene would generally want the fashion and 
model to be in sharp focus.264 
2. Critiques 
The application of these doctrines to visual works, 
including photography, is not without controversy.265 In the 
Mannion opinion discussed above,266 Judge Kaplan questioned 
the applicability of the idea/expression and merger principles to 
visual works.267 He reasoned that “it is not clear that there is 
any real distinction between the idea in a work of [visual] art 
and its expression. An artist’s idea, among other things, is to 
depict a particular subject in a particular way.”268 
Relatedly, Professor Michael Murray argues that 
merger and scènes à faire, while well suited to literary works, 
are ill suited to the realm of visual works and should play no 
part in the infringement analysis of such works.269 The 
doctrines are a “great curse” in the visual arts, he claims, 
because their application rests on the “fallacy . . . [t]hat an idea 
of a visual work and the expression of the idea can merge, or 
that artists must copy a standard image in order to depict an 
idea.”270 Specifically, in the literary context, he acknowledges 
that the doctrines operate to safeguard the public domain from 
the “excessively broad enforcement” of rights at a level of 
abstraction “beyond [the] actual words.”271 In the visual arts 
context, by contrast, infringement “is much more often based 
on a claim of literal or actual copying; no abstraction of the 
work is required, and, therefore, there is no need to 
circumscribe the scope of plaintiff’s work to protect the public 
  
 264 Bill Diodato Photography, LLC v. Kate Spade, LLC, 388 F. Supp. 2d 382, 392 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (internal citation omitted); see also Oriental Art Printing, Inc. v. Goldstar 
Printing Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 542, 547 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (subsequent history omitted) 
(noting that “each of the potentially protectable elements, i.e. the photographs’ lighting, 
angle, and the choice of plates, flow necessarily from the subject matter of the 
photographs, i.e. the realistic depiction of most common Chinese food dishes”). 
 265 Hon. Jon O. Newman, New Lyrics for an Old Melody: The Idea/Expression 
Dichotomy in the Computer Age, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 691, 697-98 (1999) 
(critiquing the application of doctrines applicable in one medium to others, including 
the abstraction analysis applicable to literary texts to visual works). 
 266 See supra Part II.D.1. 
 267 Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 268 Id. at 458. 
 269 Murray, supra note 254, at 784. 
 270 Id. at 848. 
 271  Id. at 849. 
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domain from an expansive protection of abstractions of 
plaintiff’s work.”272 
Murray appears to differ from Judge Kaplan on whether 
the idea/expression dichotomy makes sense as applied to visual 
works. While generally supporting Judge Kaplan’s view, which 
limits the application of the idea/expression, merger, and 
scènes à faire doctrines, Murray identifies the idea/expression 
dichotomy as a safety valve in his attack on the other two 
doctrines. Specifically, he states that “[t]o the extent that the 
idea of certain images is in the public domain, they are free for 
use whether characterized as scènes à faire or simply themes 
and ideas.”273 In this sense, unlike Judge Kaplan, he seems to 
contemplate that it is possible, if difficult, to separate an idea 
from its visual representation. Where they share common 
ground is in their agreement that it is possible to express 
oneself visually in a myriad of ways. 
For Judge Kaplan, the upshot is that later artists 
should not be able to appropriate the original aspects of a work 
and avoid an infringement determination by pleading “shared 
idea.” This view is undercut, however, by the irrefutable fact 
that the idea/expression dichotomy is a basic concept around 
which infringement is assessed.274 Photography is generally a 
highly representational art form, and there would seem to be 
no reason why courts should not use the traditional modes of 
analysis to assist in the infringement inquiry. Photographs 
implementing similar ideas are bound to look more alike than 
hand-painted canvases doing the same, but that does not mean 
that photography should be closed off to the free use of ideas. 
For his part, Murray is concerned that most 
infringement suits in the visual arts involve “literal or actual 
copying.”275 He argues, therefore, that there is less of a role for 
abstraction to play, and thus less of a need to constrain an 
earlier artist’s monopoly over abstractions. Without 
diminishing Murray’s comprehensive survey of merger and 
  
 272 Id. 
 273 Id. at 794.  
 274 This is the case even if, as Professor Amy Cohen argues, the dichotomy boils 
down to aesthetic judgment in the final analysis. See generally Cohen, supra note 30. 
 275 Murray, supra note 254, at 849. By this, he explains, he means more than 
duplication by “photo-mechanical means such as photographing, photocopying, or 
scanning”; he would also include the direct copying by hand of a visual work, among 
other things. Unfortunately, Murray does not explain what would constitute “literal or 
actual copying” in the photographic context, though he does acknowledge the 
imprecision of these terms. Id. at 849 n.455. 
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scènes à faire in the visual arts, a fair number of the disputes 
in the context of photography in fact do involve some kind of 
subsequent arrangement and photographing of similar subject 
matters rather than copy-and-paste duplication.276 In such 
cases, Murray’s views are not persuasive.  
At their core, the idea/expression, merger, and scènes à 
faire doctrines are useful tools in assessing the scope of 
protection to which an earlier photograph is entitled.277 In part, 
this is because of the nature of the photographic medium; given 
the likely similarity between two photographs of the same 
subject matter, reliance on these doctrines is essential to 
ensuring—if we are truly committed to the principle—that 
successive photographers are free to try their hands at similar 
material. In part, this is also because of the nature of the 
disputes that often arise over photographs. Where a product 
manufacturer enlists a second photographer to photograph its 
products—rather than engage in infringement through 
continued use of an earlier photographer’s work beyond the 
contractual terms—it must have reasonable latitude to proceed 
without threat of a suit by the earlier photographer. In these 
cases, where there may be little room for variety in how a 
product is shot, the idea/expression, merger, and scènes à faire 
doctrines can assist in assuring fluid marketing and 
advertising practices. In such cases, these doctrines, along with 
  
 276 See, e.g., Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25 (1st 
Cir. 2001); Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) (subsequent 
history omitted); Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2000); Leibovitz 
v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998); Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 
930 (2d Cir. 1914); Masterson Mktg., Inc. v. KSL Recreation Corp., 495 F. Supp. 2d 
1044 (S.D. Cal. 2007); Straus v. DVC Worldwide, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D. Tex. 
2007); Reece v. Island Treasures Art Gallery, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Haw. 
2006); Psihoyos v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 409 F. Supp. 2d 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Bill 
Diodato Photography, LLC v. Kate Spade, LLC, 388 F. Supp. 2d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); 
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Sahuc v. Tucker, 
300 F. Supp. 2d 461 (E.D. La. 2004); Gentieu v. Tony Stone Images/Chicago, Inc., 255 
F. Supp. 2d 838 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Fournier v. Erickson, 202 F. Supp. 2d 290 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002); Kaplan v. Stock Market Photo Agency, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 317 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001); Pampered Chef, Ltd. v. Magic Kitchen, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Ill. 1998); 
Caratzas v. Time Life, Inc., No. 92 Civ. 6346, 1992 WL 322033 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1992); 
Kisch v. Ammirati & Puris Inc., 657 F. Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).  
 277 Parchomovsky and Stein argue that “[c]opyright law fails to take the next 
step [beyond the threshold inquiry into originality] and calibrate the scope of the 
copyright protection to the degree of the work’s originality.” Parchomovsky & Stein, 
supra note 17, at 1506. The three doctrines discussed in this section, however, are 
important tools that serve to promote that calibration even under the current system. 
See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Response: Tiered Originality and the Dualism of 
Copyright Incentives, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 67, 75-76 (2009) (discussing doctrine of 
thin copyright in this capacity). 
1548 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4 
proof of engagement of a second photographer and the 
specifications given to the second photographer, should be 
sufficient—as long as they do not advocate copying—to defend 
against an infringement charge.278 This approach likewise 
coheres with our basic intuitions that amateur snapshot takers 
should have wide berth to shoot familiar scenes without being 
deemed copyright infringers. 
D.  Structure of Copyright, Creation, and Career 
The remaining question is whether a heightened 
originality threshold would yield more creative output from 
creators. As argued above, it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, under the system as it currently stands to 
determine how such output would be measured. And, it is far 
from clear that we would want courts to play that role. But 
even if one were to defer to Miller’s, Harrison’s, and 
Parchomovsky and Stein’s view of what heightened creative 
output might consist of, it is important to consider whether 
raising the level of originality required for protection might 
actually decrease the level of creativity achieved by authors 
because of how the relevant professional industries are 
structured. Photography is a case in point. 
For example, if protection for photographs of common 
commercial and industrial items is eliminated as a 
consequence of ratcheting up the originality threshold, 
rampant copying of photographs may begin to occur in the 
ordinary course of business. In the recent Fragrancenet.com 
case, some 900 images of perfume bottles were alleged to have 
been copied outright.279 As displayed on its website,280 
Fragrancenet.com’s images appear professionally and 
attractively rendered and, if they are made legally available for 
the taking, there is every reason to expect that many 
competing perfume retailers will simply copy the images of the 
bottles and attempt to attract customers by reducing prices or 
  
 278 Cf. Malkan, supra note 143, at 452 (suggesting that if the district court in 
SHL Imaging was correct that “[p]ractically, the plaintiff’s works are only protected 
from verbatim copying,” then “a product owner evidently would be permitted to 
intentionally reconstruct a copyrighted photograph of the product, even borrowing the 
same lighting techniques and creative details (like the blue sky reflection in the 
mirrors), as long as the second photograph was discernible from the first” (internal 
footnote, emphasis, and quotation marks omitted)). 
 279 FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. FragranceX.com, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 2d 312, 315 
(E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 280 http://www.fragrancenet.com (last visited Feb. 12, 2011).  
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altering other visual elements on their own websites. No 
perfume bottle would need to be photographed twice. 
Such a consequence may not prove troubling to many. 
Indeed, Professor Miller states that “unconventional . . . expression 
does more to advance knowledge and learning than does 
pedestrian, convention-bound expression.”281 While Miller’s views of 
the ultimate aims of copyright are unobjectionable, the means he 
advances—potentially eliminating protection for the arguably 
“pedestrian,” such as standard photographs of perfume 
bottles—might prove self-defeating. The reason, at least with 
respect to professional photography, is the nature of the 
financial arrangements undergirding creative endeavors.  
Specifically, even assuming some commercial 
photographs—of motorcycle parts, rubber doorstop covers, and 
ceramic plates for catalogs, advertisements, and magazine 
covers—may not represent the best of what the Constitution’s 
Framers had in mind for the copyright system that would be 
established, many professional photographers, who are often 
freelancers, rely upon income from these sorts of images to 
support the challenging, creative, and artistic work they do.282 
Thus, the key role that these “orthodox” images play in support 
of “original” work, and the fact that they continue to be copied 
and litigated, may weigh against Miller’s view that 
“unorthodox creative expression has greater need of protection 
against purely imitative copying”283 even if we agree that the 
increased production of “unorthodox creative expression” is in 
fact an ultimate goal of copyright. 
This interconnected business model is not new. In a 
well-known handbook, Best Business Practices for 
Photographers, photographer John Harrington acknowledges 
the second-class status that commercial work assumes for 
  
 281 Miller, supra note 10, at 464. 
 282 See, e.g., MICHAL HERON, CREATIVE CAREERS IN PHOTOGRAPHY: MAKING A 
LIVING WITH OR WITHOUT A CAMERA 45, 92, 99 (2007) (noting that a number of 
photographers have made hybrid careers in both the commercial and fine art 
photography markets and that “assignments can pay for the personal work which often 
is undertaken with the photographer’s own finances”) (quoting interview with 
photographer Joyce Tenneson); Clifford, supra note 229 (describing freelance 
photojournalist Matt Eich who “has been supplementing magazine work with 
advertising and art projects, in a pastiche of ways to earn a living”); Paula Lerner, An 
Open Letter to Students Contemplating Photojournalism, DIGITAL JOURNALIST (Dec. 
2002), http://www.digitaljournalist.org/issue0212/lerner.html (describing different 
methods of supporting creative photography pursuits). 
 283 Miller, supra note 10, at 464. 
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some.284 But, he cites Ansel Adams and Richard Avedon as 
photographers who were able to pursue creative projects based 
upon the income streams generated from commercial work.285 
These sorts of personal projects constitute work, it is 
submitted, that the scholars identified earlier might be more 
inclined to support through copyright. For example, Boston-
based photographer Paula Lerner has financed several trips to 
photograph and interview women in Afghanistan—
photojournalistic work that recently was honored with an 
Emmy Award—by accepting commercial assignments in the 
United States.286 A New York-based food photographer 
interviewed for this article stated that while the stylish and 
artistic images posted on her website at times might be too 
unique to be used for a commercial job, whether it be advertising 
or food packaging, they project a sense of style that attracts 
paying clients for commercial work, which in turn permits her to 
continue developing a portfolio of personally-driven work that is 
made freely available for public viewing on her website.287 This 
sentiment is echoed by photographer Kevin Arnold: 
I believe strongly in the value of personal projects. As a commercial 
photographer, I get to do some great work on assignment, but the 
fact is that a lot of that work ends up getting watered down in terms 
of creativity. Even clients who appreciate good imagery have to cover 
their basis. They are usually spending a lot of money and need to 
make sure they tick off all the boxes—having the right product used 
by the right demographic in the right environment. In the end, the 
imagery can be good, but it is rarely something the [sic] pushes your 
creative boundaries. I find that clients will hire you to do the work 
you love, but they need to see it first. Convincing a potential client to 
  
 284 JOHN HARRINGTON, BEST BUSINESS PRACTICES FOR PHOTOGRAPHERS (2d 
ed. 2010). 
 285 Id. at xxvii-xxix; see also JANET MALCOLM, Men Without Props, in DIANA & 
NIKON: ESSAYS ON PHOTOGRAPHY 42 (expanded ed. 1997) (noting Richard Avedon’s 
“corollary career” as a serious portrait photographer). Although she critiques the 
incentives theory of copyright in a recent article, Professor Zimmerman concedes that 
“[c]ommon sense . . . suggests that people will be able to spend less time, overall, 
producing copyrightable works if they have no prospect of being able to support 
themselves, either directly or indirectly, from this kind of work.” Diane Leenheer 
Zimmerman, Copyright as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 29, 47 (2011). And she notes that “certain works [such as ‘potboiler’ bodice-
rippers] are probably produced almost entirely because they are expected to generate a 
good return on the investment.” Id. at 47-48. 
 286 See, e.g., Paula Lerner, The Life and Death of Sitara Achakzai, THE WORLD 
(July 29, 2009), http://www.theworld.org/tag/paula-lerner. For coverage of the award, see 
Nat’l Acad. of Television Arts & Sci., 31st Annual News & Documentary Emmy Awards 
(Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.emmyonline.tv/mediacenter/_pdf/news_31st_winners_v03.pdf. 
 287 E-mail from Beth Galton, Beth Galton Studio, to author (Apr. 9, 2011, 
13:07 EST) (on file with author) (follow-up to in-depth interview (June 16, 2010)). 
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shoot in a particular style or to shoot particular subjects is hard. But 
if they see the work and it is good, they respond.288 
It may be argued that basing policy on these snapshots 
of how some photographers have structured their livelihoods so 
as to produce creative work is tantamount to proposing that 
copyright be used as “a form of protection for the industries of 
the present at the expense of those of the future” or as a means 
of preventing professional photography’s “natural death.”289 
Likewise, it might be asked whether it follows from this line of 
inquiry that the Supreme Court should have remanded in Feist 
for further evidence of the creative side projects of the phone 
book compilers whose incomes might have been crimped by the 
decision. These are valid concerns. This article simply suggests 
that, without close consideration of the ways in which tinkering 
with the originality requirement may affect particular 
industries,290 a well-intended proposal to increase creative 
output may end up stifling just that sort of work. 
According to the constitutional language, Congress is 
accorded the power to protect the “Writings”—plural—of 
authors.291 Perhaps this textual formulation highlights the 
expectation that authorial careers will produce a range of 
output, some of which may be quite banal but which serves to 
support evolving grasps at greatness. Under this theory, even if 
a photograph of an everyday commercial product or political 
event is not a masterpiece, as long as it is plausibly original, it 
can be seen as serving as a placeholder (or proxy) for the more 
creative works that the copyright system hopes—but can never 
guarantee—that an author will create over the course of his or 
her career. Parchomovsky and Stein are surely correct to note 
that “[i]f society wishes to encourage authors to produce highly 
original works and not settle for the bare minimum necessary 
to secure protection, it must reflect this preference in the 
design of the law.”292 By viewing creativity across the span of a 
career, we can explore whether and how, through mechanisms 
  
 288 Rob Haggart, Making the Break: Kevin Arnold, APHOTOEDITOR, (June 8, 
2010), http://www.aphotoeditor.com/2010/06/08/making-the-break-kevin-arnold/ (quoting 
photographer Kevin Arnold).  
 289 Tim Wu, On Copyright’s Authorship Policy, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 335, 348 
(2008). 
 290 Cf. Justin Hughes, Copyright and Its Rewards, Foreseen and Unforeseen, 
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such as the low originality threshold, the current law may 
already reflect such a preference. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has argued against a presumption of 
protectability for photography. Copyright is the grant of a 
limited monopoly and, therefore, where a work is challenged, 
copyright plaintiffs owe society an explanation or 
demonstration of what makes that work original. In most 
cases, this can be done by way of evidence that is narrative or 
comparative in nature. The proper application of originality 
principles to photography entails protection against outright 
copying in most cases293 but wide latitude to stage and shoot 
similar subject matter found in earlier photographs. Any 
initiatives to raise the bar for originality, however, should be 
carefully considered. 
Turning back to the Fairey case, this article concludes 
by addressing, photographically, Luc Sante’s suggestion that 
anyone could have taken a photographic shot equal in quality 
to Mannie Garcia’s. Below I offer an uncropped, unmanipulated 
photograph that I managed to snap from the fourth row of a 
campaign speech. I had the access, and I took about forty shots, 
of which this is by far the best. I am happy to have it, but it 
probably would not have inspired a campaign poster. 
 
Photograph by Eva Subotnik 
  
 293 To reiterate, this comment is offered without factoring in any applicable 
defenses to copying. 
